



Nuclear Armaments



An interview with Dr. Daniel Ellsberg



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As an expert on nuclear command and control and nuclear war planning — drafter of the 1961 guidance for the top-level annual operational plan for strategic warfare — and a high level national security analyst during the administrations of four different Presidents, Dr. Daniel Ellsberg has a rare background from which to describe the condition and predictable consequences of American nuclear armaments.

As publishing editors with a deep interest in American opinion and traditions, we feel that this comprehensive picture presented by one U.S. national security expert is critical to informed campaigning and voting.

Interviewer: The country is concerned more and more with both social and environmental questions. Thoreau merged social and environmental thinking in his writing. Now the two seem to have merged, along with economic considerations, over the question of nuclear power. That issue will determine the direction of our society. Could you explain your concerns about the nuclear question?

Daniel Ellsberg: I am primarily concerned with nuclear weapons.

Interviewer: What are the roots of your concern?

Ellsberg: My concern came first from reaction to Hiroshima and Nagasaki when I was 14. I have always been very concerned about our surviving nuclear weapons. 20 years ago I was working for the Rand Corporation in what I saw to be the immediate problem of deterring a Soviet attack. I was worried about what we were then led to believe was a great missile advantage of the Soviets—the “missile gap.” It turned out to be a hoax. But by the time that was agreed upon, even within the government, it had served its purpose of spurring an immense buildup on our side.

At that time I worked in the field of command and control of nuclear weapons which included looking at provisions for unauthorized action and preventing accidents with nuclear weapons. It is an enormous problem which has been overlooked by environmentalists, pretty much because it has been classified and there isn't a wealth of information available on nuclear weapons' accidents. My main work, though, was on nuclear war plans—strategic nuclear war plans. Our plans in the '50's and early '60's reflected awareness by the military—not shared with the public or even Rand—that we were vastly superior to the Russians in our strategic nuclear weapons.

These plans essentially contemplated first-use of nuclear weapons by the U.S., in other words initiating nuclear war by the United States. Presumably this would occur in a context where there was already a conflict going on—one which we had not started, a conflict not involving nuclear weapons. At that time the Eisenhower administration premised our plans on making up for the United States' deficiencies in nonnuclear weapons, in Europe in particular, but not only (or most likely) in Europe, on our willingness to threaten and if necessary initiate a nuclear war in which we were greatly superior. Such a war promised to be devastating, certainly to Europe and large parts of the world,

despite our superiority. We did make such threats a number of times; all of them were kept secret from the public.

But even more ominously than that; if US forces should find themselves in direct combat with Russian troops anywhere in the world, regardless of how this had come about, our plans proposed to launch an all-out nuclear strike against the Soviet Union, with all of our weapons, as fast as possible, hitting every city in Russia and China as fast as we could along with military targets. In other words, in 1960 and '61 I was reading war plans that prepared for the initiation of all-out nuclear war by the United States—a nuclear first-strike against the Soviet Union—arising out of some local conflict, as our only, invariant and inevitable response to direct Russian involvement. The Joint Chiefs of Staff calculated that we would cause 325 million deaths in Russia and China alone, not including deaths from fall-out from our strikes that would sweep over all the adjacent countries.

And when you added in the Russian retaliation and the European weapons—you were talking about a war which would not involve less than 500 million deaths. These were American plans for a holocaust on the scale of 100 compared to the German holocaust; the deliberate incineration of women and children and cities, of course with irreversible effects on the ecology of the

The Generals knew that these plans were not at all for retaliation because, on the contrary, the Russians had no ability to strike first.

whole earth. Taking into account the ecological effects, on the ozone layer and a great many of uncalculated ecological effects, you might well destroy all life or most life in the northern hemisphere and conceivably end all life on earth.

I thought then that I was reading how the human species was preparing to extinguish itself. There are other ways it could happen, but it seemed that we were putting the most preparation and money into arranging this way of extinguishing all life on earth. It seemed likely to come about before some other way.

I presume this planning is still going on and the immediate question is why, today, 20 years after the missile gap buildup, are we going for another major increase? Granted, we are no longer the only major nuclear war threat—the Russians also have a massive capability now. But that doesn't

explain why we are building up. On the contrary, it would seem that to add to our nuclear weapons would be less promising than before, since the Russians capability to retaliate against us is now vast and we can't eliminate it. And yet even if SALT is ratified, Carter is talking about an increase in warheads, the MX missile and the Trident that will add thousands of warheads. We have 9000 strategic warheads now.

Interviewer: Is the nuclear build-up a psychological phenomenon?

Ellsberg: I think not predominantly. Obviously in addition to whatever psychological motives there are, there are also economic motives, jobs, and profits. But I think that it is mainly an effort to try to regain the kind of superiority we had in the late '50's and early '60's to enable us to make the kind of threats that we were making all through that period.

Interviewer: That level of government is used to absolute control and they don't want to give it up, is that it?

Ellsberg: They have lost the complete monopoly of nuclear threat capability that they had for 20 years—from '45 to about '65—with the Russian buildup in the late '60's. Now there is a position, as the administration calls it rather defensively, of “equivalence”, and that is actually a fair description of what we have. They are defensive about it because some of their old colleagues from the Defense Department are saying ‘no, it is inferiority.’ That again is a hoax, as great as the missile gap was a hoax. The Russians can't get a superiority — remotely comparable to our superiority from 1945 to 1966 or so — against 30,000 warheads, and in particular against the thousands that we have at sea which they can hardly get to at all.

Interviewer: This hoax (I am trying to get it clear) — was it perpetrated by the Russians?

Ellsberg: No, by us. That is a good question. The Russians actually played into it by cooperating with us. Krushchev chose to save money by bluffing, by implying and even saying at times that he had a big missile force when he didn't.

Let me be specific about some of these things because they certainly aren't familiar. People know that from 1958 to 1960 there were claims of a missile gap in favor of the Russians. No one has heard what the actual figures were. The Russians were predicted to have, as early as '61, several hundred missiles rapidly going to a level of 500 or more. We had, in 1961, 40 Atlas missiles with more coming. We had two Polaris submarines by the end of the

year for an extra 32 missiles, 2000 intercontinental bombers and about a thousand tactical bombers capable of reaching Russia. The Russians had less than 200 intercontinental bombers. The fear was that against our 40 missiles, and targeted against our small number of Strategic Air Command (SAC) bases—the Russians would be able to launch a surprise attack

You were talking about a war which would not involve less than 500 million deaths.

with 150-300 or more missiles and wipe them out all at once. That led to an airborne alert, which meant that we kept a number of planes in the sky for very long missions to protect them against missile attack, and we took another measure in deploying short range missiles around the world.

What the Russians actually had in 1961 has never been officially revealed, but I have talked about it publicly. It was top secret at the time, and no doubt still is. What they had was four missiles. Not 200 and not 500 and not what the commander of SAC kept saying they had—1000. He was wrong by 250 times—not 250 percent.

In the fall of that year after it was clear that the Russians did not have the missiles at all, President Kennedy decided to build 1000 Minutemen. No ignorance at all about what the Russians actually had.

When I did most of my working plans in '59, '60 and '61, before I knew the truth about the missile gap, I assumed that I was reading basically retaliatory plans. It was my understanding that there was no conceivable chance under which we would initiate nuclear war because the Russians were at the moment so much more strong. The generals knew better. They knew that these plans were not at all for retaliation because, on the contrary, the Russians had no ability to strike first. So all these plans were really initiative plans, first-strike plans.

(Editors' note: In the early 1960's Ellsberg learned about another startling fact that the public is not aware of.)

Ellsberg: General Eisenhower, as President, in 1957 secretly delegated the authority to use nuclear weapons to some of his unified and specified commanders under certain limited conditions that could well have arisen at that time, such conditions as communication breakdown and serious risk or the imminence of war.

He didn't submit that decision to the American people; in fact, he told them the contrary. They might have supported it because there was some good reason for that delegation. But what he did not and could not have known were the results of that delegation in terms of risks to all humanity through the imitation of that delegation at every level of command. In '59 and '60 in my researches for the Commander in Chief-Pacific (CINPAC), Admiral Harry Felt, I found that levels of nuclear command down to the rank of major in a dusty airfield in Korea and up to the commander of the Seventh Fleet and everyone in between knew of Eisenhower's delegation, although the American public did not know.

General Eisenhower, as President, in 1957 secretly delegated to authorize use of nuclear weapons.

I wrote the guidelines for the US Nuclear Strategic Warplan in 1961 and for the years '62 and '63. Unless things have changed, no weapon assigned to that warplan has a physical lock on it that would keep the people at that level of command from using the weapon if they thought their duty demanded it — or if they were crazy or for some other reason. But craziness is not the most immediate and serious problem. Misunderstanding and misguided judgment by one of the thousands of people is a much more serious possibility. For instance, during the study for CINPAC I questioned a particular major in Kunsan, Korea, who had on his little airstrip, possibly closer to Communist territory than any other airstrip in the world, 10 F-100's, each of which had slung under it a 1.1 megaton bomb. This kind of weapon was not meant to be carried underslung; it had too high a risk of going off if it were dropped or if there was an accident. This man had under his command in that little strip ten of those, the equivalent of five World War II's.

He told me what his orders were and if Jimmy Carter were to ask his counterpart today what his orders were, I'm sure he'd get the same answer — "I can't alert those planes, even for their safeguarding; I can't let them take off, let alone execute without direct orders" (in those days from Osan, his higher base, or Kadena in Okinawa, or possibly Tokyo). The reason for those orders was that if he, on his own judgment, merely safeguarded his planes by having them take off (which other people did do more or less routinely), his weapons might go off. And if his weapons went off, all communications would go out in that area. The last thing that people would know was that in the course of an alert, either a false alarm or a real war, a thermonuclear explosion had just gone off on one of our bases. Their

belief that the war was on and that they would get no further messages, including execute messages, would then follow.

So I asked the major, "Quite aside from accidents, what would you do about your orders?" Since I had authority from Admiral Felt, he answered me: "Despite my orders, I'm the commander of this base. It is the oldest principle of war that a commander has the right and authority to protect his troops. If I thought my troops were in danger, for example, if I heard of an accident, that is, an explosion, somewhere else in the Pacific during an alert, I would send them off."

And I said, "and what do you think they would do?"

He said, "Well, you know what the orders are. They would go to a rendezvous area, reconnoiter, circle, until they got an execute order to carry out their plans, and if they did not get an execute order, they would return. Those are their orders."

"And how would that work?" I asked.

"I think they'd come back, I think most of them would. Of course, if one of them broke out of that circle and headed for his target, I think the others would follow, and they might as well," he added philosophically, "because if they go, we might as well all go."

That's actually a line from the movie Dr. Strangelove, so when I saw the movie I recognized it as a documentary, for all its black humor, a realistic description of what could actually happen.

It was my job in '59, '60 and '61 to investigate command control procedures throughout the Pacific and in Washington. What I found then was a hair trigger system extremely prone to accident or unauthorized action. It was a system with a thousand triggers and no stop switch because in those days the emphasis was so much on assuring a "go" that there was no way to send an authenticated "stop" message if the "go" was incorrect.

What I found then was a hair trigger system extremely prone to accident or unauthorized action...

Of course, the major in Kunsan didn't claim he had been authorized to alert his planes; but he did refer to the President's delegation to Admiral Felt, which he clearly took as precedent. At higher intermediate levels of command, like the Seventh Fleet, I was told by Atomic Control Officers that there existed secret delegations from CINPAC, paralleling the delegation to CINPAC by the President.

McGeorge Bundy (Special Assistant to President Kennedy for National Security), after I told him about this supposed delegation and its effects at lower levels

appointed me in the spring of 1961, to be the White House representative to further uncover the facts on this delegation of authority. I interviewed, first of all Commander Tazewell Shepherd, who was the President's naval aide, and in charge of all "go" codes. He said, "I know of no such delegation and I'm sure I would have to know." This was about three months into the Kennedy Administration. I went to the underground command post for our officers in case of alert at High Point in Virginia and looked at their control procedures. People in the field were sure there was such a delegation. I was assured no one knew of it. I'd gone as far as I could go.

But after six months, Carl Kaysen, deputy to McGeorge Bundy, did determine that there had been such a delegation. He showed me a black notebook which contained copies of letters signed by President Eisenhower to each of the Unified and Specified Commanders who possessed nuclear weapons. The letters authorized them under certain circumstances to initiate nuclear war. He also informed me that Kennedy had renewed the policy, rather than reverse the decision of his predecessor, the great general. It was again renewed by President Johnson. I don't know what the situation was in the later Johnson years or under President Nixon; it may or may not

Ellsberg's Background

Daniel Ellsberg, called as a witness by and on behalf of the defendants herein, having been first duly sworn, was examined and testified on November 28, 1979 as follows:

Direct Examination

Q: Mr. Ellsberg, I think it would be appropriate to tell the jury something about you. What is your education? Tell us about what kind of education you have.

A: I went to public school in Detroit, Michigan. I was a scholarship student. Then to a private high school in Broomfield Hills. I was a scholarship student at college at Harvard University. I had postgraduate training at Cambridge University in England, again on a fellowship, a Woodrow Wilson Fellowship.

Q: Would you speak a little louder? Can the jury hear?

A: Okay. I came back to Harvard and was a teaching Fellow and took my examinations for a doctorate. That was now 1953. And '54. Then I went into the Marine Corps for three years. I came back...

Q: Before that, let's confine ourselves to education. Did you get a doctor of philosophy?

A: I have a Ph.D. from Harvard in 1962 (in economics).

Q: All right. Should I call you Dr. Ellsberg?

A: Dan is fine.

Q: Dan? Okay, Dan. What was the nature of your thesis for your Ph.D.? What was the subject matter?

A: It was on the subject of probability and of decision making under uncertainty. It was called "Risk, Ambiguity and Decision."

Q: That's a highfalutin'. What does all that mean?

A: It was an abstract analysis of the problem of making choices under conditions of great uncertainty, confusion, among alternatives, to meet various goals. It's applied in economics to the problems of business firms, or in governments to making policies in the Defense Department. The same kind of analysis is applied to choose between weapon systems, strategic plans, different kinds of strategic projects and so forth. So an economics background is prized, is used for this kind of work in the Defense Department and that is the way I came to do it.

Q: As a strategic analyst, your methods or methodology would be applicable, I assume, to armaments, war productions and so forth?

A: It's believed to be applicable. You're hired on that basis. Whether that's a good basis or not I have come to have some doubts, but it gets you hired and from there on it's on-the-job training, essentially.

Q: All right. Now, after your formal education, did you participate in any war effort, personally? Were you in the services at all?

A: I volunteered for the Marine Corps in 1954.

Q: That was after you were graduated?

A: I had graduated from college and had been deferred, so I thought it was my duty to enlist when my deferment was up, and I became an officer, a platoon leader, and a company commander in the Marine Corps.

Q: How many years were you in the Marine Corps?

A: I enlisted for a period of two years and I was due to get out in 1956. I extended for a year because my battalion in which I was a company commander was going to the Mediterranean, expected to take part in combat, which actually came about. That was the Suez crisis in 1956, so I stayed in an extra year to be with them.

Q: And then did you get out of the service, and if so, what did you do?

A: I stayed in the reserves as long as I could, actually, without going for active duty. I asked them for extensions on that because I was at the Rand Corporation for about 10 years in all as a weapons system analyst and later as a strategic analyst.

Q: What is a "weapons systems analyst?" As a lay person I really would like some guidance as to that.

A: Someone who evaluates, analyzes and makes recommendations on the effects of proposed or existing weapons systems, like bombers or missiles or new warheads on our national security. In a broad sense you try to devise aims, strategic aims, criteria by which to judge these systems, and say whether deterrence, for example, of a Russian attack, would be better served by one weapon rather than another, or by how many weapons. It's kind of quantitative analysis for which, again, economists have been found to have good training.

Q: What did you want to say, Dan?

A: Well, I could illustrate that best, really, with the piece of analysis that I was called on to do almost on arriving at the Rand Corporation in 1958.


Q: Now, before you get on with that — A: It brought me here.

Q: Pardon?

A: It brought me to the tracks at Rocky Flats, but it illustrates the nature of the work very well.

Q: You served as a strategic analyst; was that for the United States government?

A: The Rand Corporation was a non-



have changed in substance.

I don't know whether President Carter has changed this situation; the White House has repeatedly refused to comment. But I doubt very much that he himself knows, without the most intense investigation of the actual conditions, whether his written orders would be obeyed by sincere, patriotic officers in a crisis or accident situation. In light of things I know from my own Marine Corps experience, officers often understand that they must use their own judgment for the good of the country. Here is a situation involving thermonuclear weapons with more

firepower than World War II. Whatever Jimmy Carter knows he has ordered the generals, he doesn't know how the majors are interpreting it.

Kennedy was led by his military advisors, during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, to put B-52's on the civilian runways of the biggest urban areas of the country; Boston and New York had B-52's with megaton weapons aboard. That deployment involved the risk of killing more people than in any war in history, and of leading to an exchange that would wipe this country out and end humanity.

profit corporation working in those days almost exclusively for the Defense Department, almost completely for the Air Force. Later my own work was for the Secretary of Defense — the Office of the Secretary of Defense. So their yearly contract came from out of the US Defense budget, but we were paid directly by the Rand Corporation.

Q: But it was for the benefit of the US government?

A: For the Defense Department.

Q: And would you characterize what you did in that period when you were with Rand and your functions as a strategic analyst as you described it?

A: That work, that is best described as strategic analysis, was done primarily as a consultant directly to officials of the United States government. Rand would pay my salary on the understanding that I would be loaned, in effect, to the people for whom I was directly conducting research as a kind of assistant in writing memos to them. This included to McGeorge Bundy, who was then the Special Assistant to the President, a national security job that Henry Kissinger did later or Brzezinski now; to the Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara. To his deputy, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric, and in particular to the Assistant Secretary of Defense who was then Paul Nitze. I also did consulting work for the State Department.

Q: How long did you do that kind of consulting work?

A: That was most of my work at the Rand Corporation — I joined them, as I say, in 1958 — from late 1960 to 1964 when I left Rand and joined the Defense Department as a full-time employee on the civil service.

Q: Now, let me interrupt the sequence of what you're telling the jury and His Honor. Mr. Ellsberg, did you engage in any service as a civilian for the United States government?

A: Well, all of this was as a civilian after my three years in the Marine Corps.

Q: Well, did you serve in Vietnam as a civilian?

A: In 1965 I volunteered to go to Vietnam and I joined the State Department for that purpose. I switched, then, from the Defense Department, where I had the rank of a GS-18 (the highest civil service "super-grade" equivalent to the military rank of major general) and went to Vietnam to serve in the embassy there. I was there for two years, and would have been there longer but I got hepatitis and came back.

Q: Now, you have sketched briefly for us some of your activities for the United States government. You said the Defense Department, and the State Department, and so on. But could you, Mr. Ellsberg, could you describe the character of your work as a consultant, or expertise, what sort of materials did you deal with and so on? What know-

ledge did you acquire for which you engaged in consulting for the government?

A: Since most of this work is classified and requires a number of clearances, in fact, beyond top secret — which I had — most of my learning did take place on the inside, since this sort of thing cannot even be discussed under current practice in our universities or other places because it's regarded as secret. Picking it up, then, by reading war plans, and just visiting, actually, war bases and command posts — I was studying two subjects in particular. One, the structure and the content of our strategic war plans, our nuclear war plans. Second, what's called "Command and Control of Nuclear Weapons," which has to do with the "nervous system" for armed forces — the communications systems, the command posts, the decision procedures. There, by the way, I was able to apply the kind of abstract notions that I developed in my economic work in how decisions might well be made or should be made, to the process of the President's decision problem as to when or whether to push a "Go" button, as they say in the Pentagon. In other words to order the execution of our nuclear war plans. It's a relatively "simple" — and, of course, irreversible — decision if the decision is "Go."

In that context, then, I read all of the structure of our war plans in the Pacific. I became probably as familiar with the content of those war plans, the plans that would have to be executed, as any civilian in the country, and I was assigned the task in 1961 of writing the Kennedy Administration official guidance, top secret, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for the strategic nuclear war plans. The draft that I wrote was signed by Mr. McNamara and issued by him as a directive to the Joint Chiefs, and it remained the basis for strategic war planning through the early '60's. I know that because I reviewed those plans year by year — I was the only civilian to do that — for Mr. Gilpatric, the Deputy Secretary.

Q: Mr. Ellsberg, in your studies and research relating to your role as a consultant to the United States government, did you have occasion to study and consider the dangers and risks of war plans?

A: Well, this was my main consideration, not just with war plans, but with procedures and everything else. What changes would make a nuclear war more likely, what developments would make a Soviet attack likely, what dangers would make more likely an accidental explosion — I am particularly concerned, myself, with that — or unauthorized use of weapons.

Q: By that, you mean by "accidental" —

A: An accidental explosion during an alert, for example, what are the risks of that? They are very great in my opinion.

The fact that we haven't yet ended all life on earth with the weapons we built that are capable of doing this is only a beginning of the estimate of whether we've been adequately prudent. In my own estimate, we've been lucky but very unwise, and we should change what we do.

I've always thought that the crucial danger was not the irrational or the insane person as in Dr. Strangelove, although that is a real danger, but the highly dedicated, disciplined officer who might feel, in a certain situation, that his duty compelled him to do what his superiors would want him to do but couldn't order because they were dead or out of communication.

I told all of this information to Clement Zablocki, who had just held hearings on this subject in '76 and had gotten false information. He had been told by a government representative that there had never been any such delegation. This man, an admiral, may not have known the truth. So I told Zablocki the true situation. Zablocki said, "How do we know the Russian system is any better?"

I said, "We don't. That means the situation is at least twice as bad as I've been describing. And we don't know what the Brazilian's system will be, or the Israeli's, when they get it, or the British, or the French, or the Chinese. Each multiplies the problem."

There are not to my knowledge any more locks on those weapons now in the field on bombers, Strategic Air Command (SAC) bombers, Polaris submarines, or Tactical Air Command (TAC) weapons than there were before.

By the way, recently a SAC major was almost courtmartialed because he demanded evidence that the message he might get to launch an attack would, in fact, be coming from the President. He was told that he had no need to know. Under those conditions he said he would not "go", although if he were sure it was from the President he would "go." Rather than assure him on that point, they threatened to courtmartial him and then let him resign. Well, he did have a need to know and we have a need to know.

There are provision, as the public is aware, that require more than one person to make "go" decisions to turn locks on weapons, but that still delegates the decision to the lower level of command, whether it's two people, or 10 people who have to make it.

I don't think the dangers have ever been appreciated by the higher levels, and that's why the public has to act democratically now to insist that Congress join this dialogue which has so far been limited to the President and the military so as to inform the public and become informed itself.

I reported to McGeorge Bundy what I had learned about 18 years ago: my knowledge that the machinery of nuclear war that had been built up by my colleagues at Rand and the Defense Department was essentially out of control — out of presidential control, and as I saw it, human control — and that the risks of themonuclear war resulting from our own well-intentioned efforts were very great, greater than the President himself could know.

In 1971, the same time as I released the Pentagon Papers, I began to urge Congresspeople, starting with a handful of Senators, including Ervin, Fulbright, Gravel and Symington, to have hearings on this question. They seemed very interested. Only Congress can subpoena witnesses and get the testimony which even a President has trouble getting. This is what I tried to do with the Pentagon Papers for two years, with no success. I didn't get them in both cases for the same reason: Congress didn't want to fight the executive or the military on these issues, despite the urgency of the problem. The public didn't care, they said. And I have finally figured out that the public doesn't care because they don't know there's a problem.

The question of delegation of authority was brought up publicly by Goldwater during the Presidential election of 1964. He claimed that it was irresponsible for the

Commander-in-Chief to have exclusive decision-making powers; our Commander in Europe should have delegated power to use "small, conventional nuclear weapons" on his own. Johnson's response, a very popular one with the voters, was clear; under no circumstances would he delegate the authority to start a nuclear war. But Johnson had *already* reaffirmed the policy started by President Eisenhower, a fact of which the public was not aware.

In short, democracy wasn't working in 1964. And it's never worked in the area of nuclear control because the public has been kept ignorant by the secrecy system. Secrecy is surely as well justified in this area as in any other in history; that was obvious to me when I was part of that system. But it's also obvious to me now what the costs to democracy and to our survival have been of subverting democracy by allowing that secrecy, even in this area. That is why I'm speaking out now.

The public has to act democratically now to insist that Congress join this dialogue which has so far been limited to the President and the Military.

We'll never get to the truth unless an informed public demands it. That's how the Vietnam War was finally ended. And that is what the Mobilization for Survival is setting out to do now.

(Editor's note: Ellsberg talked about President Eisenhower and his "New Look" for the military, which meant a reliance on nuclear weapons. "A bigger bang for the buck," said Charles Trater Wilson, head of the Department of Defense (he also said, "What is good for General Motors is good for America"). After the "New Look" came the Bikini Era ...)

Ellsberg: The idea of the Eisenhower "New Look" was massive retaliation, extreme reliance on nuclear weapons. Not mainly for retaliation against nuclear attacks but for the threat of initiating nuclear war to get our way in the world in place of other threats, whether economic or military. What most people imagine was that this was a kind of bluff, but that he really wasn't using the nuclear capability in any diplomatic way. That was wrong. Eisenhower writes in his memoirs that he not only made nuclear threats to the Chinese to get them to the conference table in Korea in '53, but he believes that they were effective in getting the terms that he wanted. Had any of you heard of that?

Interviewers: No.

Ellsberg: What I discovered, going back to Truman who made such threats in 1950, is that every term of every president has seen the serious recommendation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of plans involving the initiation of nuclear warfare under certain circumstances. More significantly, at least four Presidents have secretly authorized advanced preparations for such first-use, or have actually threatened adversaries with U.S. first-use in an ongoing crisis.

The memoirs of President Eisenhower reveal that a direct threat to use nuclear weapons was made to the Chinese in 1953 and was regarded by President Eisenhower — and his vice President — as having led to successful negotiations ending the Korean War.

Richard Nixon's memoirs confirm French Prime Minister Bidault's account of an offer to the French of three tactical weapons for the relief of the French forces surrounded at Dienbienphu in 1954.

Other occasions include full preparation, directed by Eisenhower, for the use of tactical nuclear weapons to break the siege of the Chinese offshore island of Quemoy in 1958; likewise, for use against a possible Iraqi move toward Kuwait, also in 1958 (during the "Lebanon Crisis"); serious proposals by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, not rejected by President Kennedy, for the possible use of nuclear weapons in Laos in 1961; and, later warnings, not ruled out by LBJ, that nuclear weapons might be needed

for the defense of the marines surrounded at Khe Sanh in 1968.

H.R. Haldeman has revealed that President Nixon did indeed have a secret plan to win the war in Viet Nam when he entered office in 1969: by explicitly, secret threats to the North Vietnamese and their allies that he would escalate the war massively, including the possible use of nuclear weapons, if they did not meet his terms (see box). Haldeman's account has been confirmed by other sources. Nixon himself, without specifying the context of his threats of escalation, recounts in detail his "November ultimatum" to the North Vietnamese, to be carried out on November 1, 1969. According to Nixon it was only the success of the anti-war movement in October and November and the New Mobilization in Washington, D.C. in November that prevented him from carrying out his threat, by denying him the possibility of unified public support behind an escalation of the war (see box).

Nixon's account, unremarked by virtually all commentators, is the most dramatic possible testimony to the effectiveness of the legal, non-violent demonstrations not only in limiting escalation, but in prolonging by an additional decade so far the moratorium on the combat use of nuclear weapons.

What follows from all of these examples, however, is that there has been no 35-year moratorium upon the active consideration and use of nuclear weapons in "atomic diplomacy." The threats by Nixon and now Carter demonstrate that this use of our weapons continue to be made even after the achievement by the Soviet Union of nuclear parity, both strategic and tactical, with the United States. These threats in a world in which such parity exists are vastly more dangerous than before; and they will become even more dangerous as weaker adversaries acquire nuclear capabilities for retaliation or for threats and initiatives of their own.

Throughout the first twenty years of the post war period United States reliance on nuclear threats in the context of overwhelming nuclear superiority encouraged the United States and its allies to neglect every alternative basis for self-defense and for international order.

Interviewer: How about President Carter?
Ellsberg: President Carter's commitment to use "any means necessary, including military force" against a further Soviet move into the Persian Gulf region is, at its heart, a threat of the possible initiation of tactical nuclear warfare by the United States. Behind the warning in his state of the Union message of January 23 stands the conclusion of a Defense Department study, summarized in the *New York Times*, Feb. 2, 1980: "that the American forces could not stop a Soviet thrust into northern Iran and that the United States should therefore consider using 'tactical' nuclear weapons in any conflict there."

The Soviets could move 23 divisions with 200,000 troops into their neighboring country within 30 days, confronting the 20,000 Americans and equipment brought in by then with "more than a five-to-one advantage in forces," as the report, leaked to the *Times* pointed out. It is quoted as concluding: "To prevail in an Iranian scenario, we might have to threaten or make use of tactical nuclear weapons."

Even before the President spoke, this same conclusion was reflected at White House level in backgrounders given to *Los Angeles Times* reporters Jack Nelson and Robert Toth, Jan. 18. Heralding the President's message, "White House and other senior officials dealing with national security" told them that "if the Soviet Union carried its expansion into Iran or Pakistan, the United States would have little choice but to oppose it militarily." These officials went on to say what the President, speaking to the public a few days later, did not put into words: "Such a war ... would almost certainly become a nuclear war, because the United States has concentrated on its nuclear weapons rather than on matching the Soviet Union's massive strength in conventional warfare."

Has any human being the right to impose such risks on the earth's population and its future? That question of legitimacy seems to answer itself. But putting it aside, so as to stay in the domain of responsible political discussion, we come to the question of credibility. Unlike the students in Iran, U.S. Presidents, no matter what they do, are not commonly described as "militant," "fanatic" or "terrorist." Can Presidential threats of mass hostage-killing be sufficiently believable? Moreover, are American officials not bound by an explicit or at least tacit "no-first-use" commitment, never to be the first to use nuclear weapons in a crisis or non-nuclear conflict?

Now again on the evening news we watch the tanks and helicopters of occupying forces hunting lightly-armed villagers on their home soil. We may wonder: Are Russians as unable to learn from American crimes as Americans were from the French? It all looks, horribly, familiar. And then we listen to our President, describing accurately the Soviet Union as "using its great military power against a relatively defenseless nation," but going on to call this, "a radical and aggressive new step... that could pose the most serious threat to world peace since the Second World War." And we wonder: Where was this man during Vietnam? What lessons has he drawn from that experience?

Could one of those lessons — refracted through three frustrating years in the White House — have been: "Next time the stakes are high, threaten nuclear weapons?" That is, after all, the same lesson that Richard Nixon drew, and implemented secretly, by 1969. And he was only a few years ahead of other members of the Establishment who have come to conclude since 1975 that, in effect, "Goldwater was right."

The Russians, whatever their subjective motives for their aggression, share heavy responsibility for the dangerous escalation of the arms buildup and for the costs and risks of the new cold war that was clearly likely to ensue in this country. But President Carter too, to say the least, shares responsibility for these decisions, and still more for his Administration's public efforts to legitimize first-use threats of nuclear weapons as a response. And we will be responsible either for accepting that policy and legitimation — openly or by our silence — or for forcefully rejecting it.

To make first-use threats in a world so loaded with nuclear weapons is to play Russian Roulette with a gun pointed at the heads of all our children. A policy — like our long-term NATO policy and like the present "Carter Doctrine" for the Persian Gulf — that can be carried out only by threat of initiation of nuclear warfare is not an acceptable policy with respect to human survival. Even if such a war, outside NATO, should be limited in area and intensity, it would be a precedent for other nuclear wars that before long would escape any such limits. And the second such outbreak would not again await 35 years; more likely it would not take 35 weeks for the precedent of tactical nuclear first-use to be imitated by ourselves or others. The onset of such an epoch would mark a drastic, immediate decline of United States security, indeed the security of all life on earth.

What Carter is doing by making public what the Soviets already undoubtedly regarded as serious implicit threats of nuclear initiatives to preserve our influence in the Persian Gulf oil regions is to legitimize such threats in other future cases where the public is less likely to perceive either an urgent threat from a rival superpower or a "vital national interest." The lesson learned from Nixon was that in an age of nuclear parity, public support of nuclear threats is both more necessary — if the threats are to work — and harder to come by, than in the golden age of U.S. near-monopoly.

Of course, as the leaked Pentagon study makes clear, even if the U.S. did match Soviet conventional strength in overall global terms it could hardly do so in a region bordering Russia, any more than the Soviet Union today could hope to outweigh U.S. conventional strength on our own borders, in order, say, to control resources

and block our access to oil in Mexico or Canada. This regional disadvantage for the U.S. in at least the northern part of the Persian Gulf region would not really be reduced by our instituting the draft, or by creating a Rapid Deployment Force; or, indeed, by actually using tactical nuclear weapons, with which Soviet forces are also well equipped.

It is in these circumstances that the deterrent tactic recommends itself to a U.S. Administration of threatening the possibility of regional annihilation, with a link to global holocaust. To be effective such threats of mutual destruction call for measures of commitment to enhance their credibility. So we have the President's public pledge of effective action ("any means necessary") — heightening dramatically his personal commitment and bidding for public support — accompanied by authoritative leaks and testimony revealing the Administration's own recognition that non-nuclear means

alone could not be adequate; while publicity is given to deployments of nuclear-armed carriers and strategic bombers to the area. The President's strategy is to wire up the Middle East to a regional Doomsday Machine in just the way that the student captors of American hostages in Teheran claim to have wired the U.S. Embassy for demolition in the event of attack.

Such threats can work. We have not attempted to raid the Teheran Embassy; the Soviets may not tread upon the nuclear tripwires President Carter has laid around their present zone of occupation. But these tactics have certain risks, obvious in both cases. Only the scale is different; by President Carter's policy, every human in the Middle East and every city in the northern hemisphere is held hostage.

A demonstration, in advance, of public acceptance of the threat policy is almost essential to its prospects of success, and thus to its adoption; the Russian invasion of Af-

The American History of Nuclear Crisis — Truman to Nixon

(So far as is known from public announcements, memoirs of Presidents and their associates, and studies based on official documents.)

Site of Threat	Date	President	U.S. Nuclear Involvement	References
Iran	1946	Truman	Secret threat	Sen. Jackson, <i>Time</i> , Jan. 28, 1980.
Korea	1950	Truman	Public threat of attack	Press Conference, Nov. 30, 1950. Also: Truman memoirs: <i>Years of Trial and Hope</i> , NY, 1965, Vol. II, pp.450-51.
Korea	1953	Eisenhower	Secret threat of attack	Eisenhower's memoirs, <i>Mandate for Change</i> , Vol. I, pp. 178-81. Also: George and Smoke, <i>Deterrence in American Foreign Policy</i> , 1974, pp. 237-41.
Dienbienphu	1954	Eisenhower	US offer nuclear weapons to French	Prime Minister Bidault in film <i>Hearts & Minds</i> , and in Drummond and Coblenz, <i>Duel at the Brink</i> (NY, 1960), pp. 121-22., and Richard Nixon's memoirs, <i>RN</i> , (NY, 1978) pp. 150-55.
Iraq/Kuwait ("Lebanon Crisis")	1958	Eisenhower	President orders secret preparation	Blechman and Kaplan, <i>Force without War</i> , (Washington, 1978), pp. 238, 256.
Quemoy, Taiwan Straits	1958	Eisenhower	President orders secret preparation	Morton H. Halperin, <i>The 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis</i> (Declassified study)
Laos	1961	Kennedy	Recommendation by Joint Chiefs of Staff	Sorensen, Kennedy, (NY, 1966) pp. 721-28.
Berlin	1961	Kennedy	Public threat	Blechman and Kaplan, pp. 343-439.
Cuba	1962	Kennedy	Public threat	R.F. Kennedy, <i>Thirteen Days</i> , (NY, 1971).
Khe Sanh, South Vietnam	1968	Johnson	Gen. Westmoreland warns of possible need	Schandler, <i>The Unmaking of a President</i> (Princeton, 1977) pp. 86-91.
Vietnam	1969-72	Nixon	Repeated secret threats	Haldeman's memoirs: <i>The Ends of Power</i> , (NY, 1978) pp. 81-85, 97-98, and <i>Richard M. Nixon's Memoirs</i> , pp. 393-414; and Eqbal Ahmad, Roger Morris, interviews with Daniel Ellsberg

A Program for Global Disarmament

1. No First Use

The United States government and Congress shall establish as its policy the clear intention never to be the first to use any nuclear weapon, and to work to conclude treaties with all nations renouncing the first use of all nuclear weapons.

This intention should be demonstrated and backed up with withdrawal from all "front-line" theater locations — such as the two Germanies — of all tactical nuclear weapons, with large reductions in stockpiles in all East and West Europe.

2. Moratorium

The United States should propose to the Soviets an immediate bilateral moratorium on the testing, production, and deployment of all new nuclear weapons systems. Such a freeze then to be formalized and made permanent by treaty—to include the following items:

Scope of Freeze

(1) Underground nuclear tests should be suspended, pending final agreement on a comprehensive test ban treaty.

(2) There should be a freeze on testing and production of all aircraft and missiles which have nuclear weapons as their sole or main payload.

Afghanistan provided a nearly perfect opportunity to bid for it. The analogy is striking to the North Vietnamese attack on an American destroyer on August 4, 1964. This provided credibility to the Administration claim (false, but partially sincere at the time) of a second attack, which was used to legitimize the policy of bombing North Vietnam (and, as it happens, to demonstrate Presidential toughness-and-restraint, in an election year).

If forthcoming, public support for the overall Carter Doctrine in this crisis would encourage future U.S. nuclear threats, primarily, as in the past, against adversaries who do not yet have any nuclear weapons with which to retaliate. And before long, one of these threats will "have" to be carried out. To restrain them from this catastrophic course, Carter and his successors require a public movement on the scale of the movement that kept Nixon from carrying out his threats in 1969. We must not fail to meet this need.

The Russian invasion of Afghanistan has brought the underlying willingness of American Presidents in the nuclear age to issue nuclear threats or to prepare secretly to initiate nuclear war to the surface of public discussion where it can be challenged and stopped. We have lived on the brink more often than we knew; this clearing in the mist offers us a chance to move away from the edge, dragging the world's leaders with us.

(Editor's note: In addition to Carter's appeal for public support for the use of nuclear weapons, Dr. Ellsberg pointed out that Carter went into production of the neutron bomb over a year ago.)

Interviewer: I thought he stopped it?

Ellsberg: Well a lot of people thought that; I thought it for quite a while. It turns out that there was a closed session with a congressional committee late in April 1978 where they decided to go ahead on the components (of the neutron warhead) at full blast, which is what they have been doing ever since October, 1978, with essentially no awareness of the public. There was an announcement at Rocky Flats by the manager that they were then producing the "components." They have a design in which a certain component can be added, in the field, minutes before the weapons are fired converting them from a quote "normal nuclear weapon" — if these things can be regarded as normal — into an enhanced radiation weapon. Since they don't put it in until just before it is fired they could say, up until they use them, We don't have a neutron bomb.

(Editor's note: The neutron bomb was conceived by an associate of Dr. Ellsberg's at Rand, Sam Cohn. The bomb was needed in the late fifties as a reason to continue nuclear testing, in order to reject the Soviet proposals for a comprehensive ban. Edward Teller thought that a "clean" bomb, one without nuclear fallout, was achievable if

they could do some more testing.)

Ellsberg: With this weapon, Sam, as I understood it, hoped that troops could go immediately in, because the killing mechanism was not fallout but prompt radiation, high energy neutrons that would be released by the fusion reaction. As Sam described it, it was a "very efficient, cost-effective people-killer." It was for killing people, not for destroying property. That virtue, as he hoped it would be seen, meant that our own decision makers would be less inhibited in using a weapon that would make the landscape radioactive forever.

What is ominous about the neutron bomb is that it is a first-use weapon only, because it is a relatively clean weapon, and a relatively precise weapon. It has no advantage whatever if someone else has already blown the buildings down with dirty weapons against nuclear attack; it's no good to use "second." It is only for using first, but even then only against people who don't have the nuclear weapons with which to reply, that is people other than the Soviets or other members of the nuclear club.

I told Sam that far from being a good weapon to use against the Soviets, it is least good against Russia because they would be certain to reply with their dirty, nuclear weapons, of which they have many thousands.

Now the government talks about using neutron bombs against a Russian tank attack. The neutron bomb has the peculiar characteristic of causing certain death in horrible agony during a period of six days to six weeks. Over that period of time the victims are still operational. Those are very angry people, and if armed with nuclear weapons they're fantastically dangerous people. Russian divisions are armed with nuclear weapons. To make walking dead men of Russians armed with nuclear weapons seems to be quite an imprudent thing to do. I would not rely on those troops to obey Russian orders not to use the nuclear weapons on cities in revenge; not after what had just been done to them. I hope their weapons have locks, but I wouldn't even count on that. But we're not going to use those weapons against Russians. We're not that thoughtless.

Interviewer: Why have no nuclear wars occurred since 1945?

Ellsberg: Clearly not because U.S. aims, efforts, and demands met with success without using nuclear weapons; in each of these cases (except the Chinese off-shore islands) the U.S. ultimately accepted failure. Were the presidents simply bluffing? Going on the evidence now available, I don't believe it.

Where Soviet forces were directly involved (as in the Cuban crisis in 1962 and the Berlin crisis in 1961), fear of Soviet response was obviously the major concern. But in the instances I've given where Soviets were not directly threatened, the presidents

US Delivery Vehicles This Includes Soviet Delivery Vehicles

In Production:

Improved Minuteman ICBM

Trident I SLBM

In Development:

MX ICBM Pershing II IRBM

Trident I SLBM

Air-launched cruise missile

Long-range land-and-sea based cruise missiles

Soviet Delivery Vehicles

In Production:

SS-17, -18, -19 ICBMs

SS-N-18 SRBM (for Delta subs)

SS-20 IRBM

Backfire bomber

In Development:

Improved or follow-on versions of

SS-17, 18, & -19 ICBMs, and of

SS-N-18 SLBM

(3) The number of land- and submarine-based launch tubes for nuclear missiles should be frozen. Replacement subs could be built, but with no net increase in SLBM tubes.

(4) No further Mirving or other changes to existing missile warheads would be permitted.

All of the above measures can be verified by existing national means of verification with high confidence.

The following measures cannot be verified with the same confidence, but an effort to include them might prove feasible:

(5) Production of fissionable materials (enriched uranium and plutonium) for weapon purposes should be halted.

(6) Production of additional nuclear weapons (bombs) should be halted.

3. Phase out Nuclear Weapons

The US should enter into negotiations with all nations to phase out the world's nuclear arsenal.

believed, rightly or wrongly, that Soviet nuclear response — i.e., any nuclear response — to a U.S. first-use of nuclears was a very low risk. That confidence was based on a nuclear preponderance by the U.S. that neither side will ever have again, since it involved a near-absence of Soviet strategic nuclear capability against the U.S., a virtual monopoly of strategic nuclear power. Clearly another major factor in the miracle that U.S. nuclear threats were never carried out — a factor that, unlike our monopoly, has lasted till now — was the fact that existing nuclear weapons destroyed too many people and made the earth too radioactive for too long to justify their use on any terms, even narrow military terms. Current nuclear weapons would have made the very territory we purported to defend uninhabitable for perhaps half a million years. Therefore, presidents anticipated a public reaction in our own country and elsewhere, that kept them from using them.

However, if the neutron bomb, with its reduced (though still massive) destructiveness and its greatly reduced longlived radioactivity had existed, I believe it would have been used more than once. And as a result of our breaking that precedent, some other nations would probably by now have used some of the nuclear weapons they have, which happen to be "dirty."

Interviewer: Where might the neutron bomb be used, then?

Ellsberg: This warhead is designed to be used advantageously only for first-use against an adversary who does not have any nuclear weapons with which to retaliate: the kind of opponents we have actually fought in the last thirty years — the Koreans, the Chinese (before they exploded an atom bomb), and the Indochinese. In the future, occasions might arise again in Korea or in the Middle East. Perhaps someday, they might be used in South Africa, where the properties of the neutron bomb would recommend themselves to the owners of the land and buildings of Johannesburg.

It's because of its possible use in such circumstances, outside Europe, that I think the neutron warhead is the nuclear weapon most likely to be the first used since Nagasaki — and therefore the most dangerous human development since the H-bomb.

Interviewer: How would you expect the development of the neutron bomb to affect the world power situation?

Ellsberg: It could launch an era in which nuclear weapons of all kinds would actually be used in combat, not merely stockpiled for profit or threat. It would destroy the moratorium since Nagasaki on the use of nuclear weapons. Breaking that precedent would not only encourage us to use nuclear weapons in future situations much more frequently and promiscuously, it would assure other countries that they could expect that use in the future and that therefore they had better arm themselves.

Moreover, the neutron bomb would, I'm sure initiate a whole new development of nuclear weapons. These "better, cleaner, more usable bombs" will be used in combat not only by the U.S. but by other countries, and once that occurs, we definitely get into a period where nuclear weapons are traded, given in aid — under the counter, if necessary, covertly. There will be thefts, possibly terrorist thefts, and we will never know for sure what is a true theft and what is just a covert way for our government to transfer these weapons to someone else.

Interviewer: Do you see a connection between the United States' energy policy and the proliferation of nuclear weapons?

Ellsberg: Nuclear reactors — of which we were the first and most crucial promoters — are the process of proliferating to a point that the Committee for Economic Development has forecast that by year 2000 a hundred countries will have reactor energy programs capable of producing nuclear weapons. And by that time these hundred countries will have created enough waste material to make one-million Hiroshima-type bombs. That's the world we are headed for. It's hard to believe that humans can survive in that world.

There is also the question of reprocessing facilities, which admittedly produce weapons-grade plutonium. There are already several such facilities around the world, and now Brazil is contemplating setting up a program. They will get their facility from the Germans. The Germans are currently in the business of selling that capability to produce nuclear weapons, yet we like to think of the Germans as not having nuclear weapons.

Interviewer: There is a tradition of a use of nuclear threats from the end of the second world war.

Ellsberg: Yes, yes, from the time they were invented. Presidents have gone through periods when they had hoped that it was the answer to all their problems. Nixon, according to Haldeman, clearly hoped that when he came into office.

When they had the A bomb they thought that would be the answer to all their problems. They quickly discovered that the opponents don't back down that readily. One can't, quote, "rule the world" just with nuclear weapons as some of the more euphoric thought. But even though the H bomb is not what Stimson called the A bomb, "the master card," presidents believe that the threat of it gets them out of tight spots like Dienbienphu, Khe Sanh and Quemoy. And thus it is not merely for some abstract philosophical reason that each president refuses to issue a nuclear war. The Chinese have done that. The Russians have offered it repeatedly on a bilateral basis, but we have always refused to make that commitment.

Interviewer: What is the mentality of an American president and the people around

him that he wouldn't just say we won't use it first and negotiate without that card?

Ellsberg: The answer is implicit in the history that I gave. He quickly learns—if he didn't know before he came to office, and he probably didn't—that his predecessors had found this most useful at various times. Remember it wasn't just that they used threats but that on a number of occasions the President felt, rightly or wrongly, that the threat had been effective. It is, as they see it, a record of success.

Interviewer: What do the officials know?

Ellsberg: Well that we have been making threats like that all the time. I will give a very momentous example. The top three civilians involved in the decision to drop the atom bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Truman, Stimson and Byrnes, were all in favor of dropping it. Each one said later that they never regarded it as a moral issue at all, but only as a question of how fast could you get it over there and what target should you pick and so forth. Some people have found that hard to understand. But these three knew what the American public as a whole has never been quite conscious of: that they were already killing more civilians in single day raids over Japan with high explosives and napalm, than the atom bomb was likely to kill. The raid over Tokyo in March of 1945 killed more people than either atom bomb. They were quite conscious we were already destroying civilians—largely women and children and old people—in vast numbers. The atom bomb, to them, was simply a more efficient way of doing that.

At the onset of the nuclear age, the fact is that it was very easy for these people to order the atom bomb attack in the world they lived in, a secret world in which they knew that the raids they were ordering with non-nuclear weapons were more destructive than the atom bomb was likely to be. "It was no big deal," as Lieutenant Calley said about My Lai. And he was referring to the very same phenomenon—we were killing Vietnamese women and children in much larger numbers in a normal day's bombing operations.

That is the world that these leaders live in. So coming back to my earlier point, even when they are not directly at war they live in a world in which they know these proposals are made by their trusted subordinates; their predecessors have made nuclear threats; the preparations are all made, and Congress has certainly paid for the weapons. And so they don't have to be very unusual men to want to go on using these threats; they are not monsters.

Many people in the Air Force and the Pentagon were very proud of the Missile Gap hoax. They said there was no other way they could get enough tax money for the necessary weapons.

We are seeing a pattern of behavior that has been around for a very long time—and I'll be more specific in a moment—now simply implemented with nuclear weapons. The kinds of threats that were made before nuclear weapons are now still being made with nuclear weapons, as if they were just another kind of violent machinery to be fitted into the same pattern of behavior. Now that in itself represents very gross insensitivity and ignorance on the part of these men. They do not conceive the difference in violence and destructiveness in these weapons. They don't face up to it—just as the members of the public don't. But it is true, probably, that in the long-run, we won't be able to get away from the risks of these weapons until we attack and change this basic pattern of behavior.

Interviewer: I call it bully behavior.

Ellsberg: The first pattern that I would fit this into is essentially that of imperial behavior; of trying to keep what they call order, law and order, but from the point of view of most people or of their victims or subjects, it is the imperial ruler's law and order—imposed as part of their hegemony. Very often it is oppressive and exploitive, but even if it's fair, it's very centralized

power over which they preside. The threats that I've described, by the way, have all been against non-nuclear powers: in some cases they were people who in the past were colonized, the Indo-Chinese, the Koreans. Now we don't colonize them exactly, but we want to make sure that "our" people run the administration in those areas as in Taiwan or South Korea, or for thirty years South Vietnam. And to do that we back them up, as in the case of Vietnam with troops and marines, or in other cases, exclusively with threats of air intervention and ultimately nuclear weapons.

Interviewer: That describes the superpowers as a den of thieves, and to use the term loosely, there's a gentleman's agreement that they are not going to blow each other up. They would rather threaten little people.

Ellsberg: Yes. It is understood that we have a commitment to our allies in Europe. A commitment to deter nuclear attack against them actually hasn't been the purpose of any large part of our nuclear force. Because at any given time that aim—like the other publicly proclaimed, deterring a nuclear attack on the U.S.—could have been achieved with a very small fraction of what we actually had and what we were actually buying in the way of nuclear weapons. So the bulk of what we actually had and were buying was always for purposes that the officials rarely informed the public about, because they didn't expect they would get public support for it. They kept the public ignorant of the real purposes: first, that our "defense" of Europe against even non-nuclear attack by Russia would involve a U.S. first strike against the Soviet Union; and, second, that at some time in the future as in the past, presidents might want to initiate, or threaten to initiate nuclear weapons against small countries that didn't have them.

Interviewer: Do you think the Russians, who now have a formidable nuclear arsenal will be using it in the same way?

Ellsberg: Yes, I think the analogy is probably pretty great, because I don't think that this is exclusively an American failure or shortcoming. I think that now that they have a position of parity with us, the chance that they will make such threats against such people who are much smaller than they are, not against us, but against, for example, China—let alone opponents who are even smaller than China. I think you could expect, for instance, that it would be an element in their control even in Eastern Europe.

As I pointed out, for a generation the United States did feel free to intervene, indirectly and in some cases directly with its own forces in places very distant from its own shores. And to back up that intervention with the threat to initiate local nuclear war if our forces were threatened by overwhelming forces.

Our technology has reflected a desire for superiority. Not just a random superiority in terms of arbitrary numbers, but a very specific functional ability to destroy Soviet military forces. The Soviets, asymmetrically, not having either our transportable "projection forces or our nuclear counterforce capabilities" were not able to intervene at places distant from their shores or to make first-use threats.

Now, though, Soviet forces, both in nature and in capability, have grown much like ours. And thus the U.S. arms buildup advocates on our side can foresee two ominous possibilities that have some reality. The first, and the more ominous, is the possibility that the Soviets themselves will begin making nuclear threats of the kind we have secretly made repeatedly over the last twenty years. And they will feel freer to intervene in distant places with these threats as a back up. In order to do this, they don't have to have superiority. Our recent history shows this. Such a use of nuclear weapons was considered to avoid tactical defeat at Khe Sanh in 1968; later in Vietnam between 1969 and 1972 in a period when the U.S. no longer had superiority. What is virtually a necessity in such intervention and for such threats is that one not be in a position of inferiority.

And this the Soviets have achieved during

Nixon's nuclear threats Haldeman's Memoirs

"The Communists regarded (Nixon) as an uncompromising enemy whose hatred for their philosophy had been spelled out over and over again in two decades of public life. Nixon saw his advantage in that fact. 'They'll believe any threat of force that Nixon makes because it's Nixon,' he said.

"He saw a parallel in the action President Eisenhower had taken to end another war. When Eisenhower arrived in the White House, the Korean War was stalemated. Eisenhower ended the impasse in a hurry. He secretly got word to the Chinese that he would drop nuclear bombs on North Korea unless a truce was signed immediately. In a few weeks, the Chinese called for a truce and the Korean War ended.

"In the 1950's Eisenhower's military background had convinced the Communists that he was sincere in his threat. Nixon didn't have that background, but he believed his hardline anti-Communist rhetoric of twenty years would serve to convince the North Vietnamese equally as well that he really meant to do what he said. He expected to utilize the same principle of a threat of excessive force...

"The threat was the key, and Nixon coined a phrase for his theory which I'm sure will bring smiles of delight to Nixon-haters everywhere. We were walking along a foggy beach after a long day of speechwriting. He said, 'I call it the Madman Theory, Bob. I want the North Vietnamese to believe I've reached the point where I might do *anything* to stop the war. We'll just slip the word to them that, 'for God's sake, you know Nixon is obsessed about Communism. We can't restrain him when he's angry—and he has his hand on the nuclear button'—and Ho Chi Minh himself will be in Paris in two days begging for peace.'...

"Nixon had conceived the 'Madman Theory' as the way to do it. Henry (Kissinger) perfected the theory and carried it to the secret series of Paris peace talks: A threat of egregious military action by an unpredictable US President who hated Communism, coupled with generous offers of financial aid. Henry arrived at the peace negotiations fully expecting his plan to be successful.

"But there the theory—and Nixon and Kissinger's hopes for peace in Nixon's first year—crumbled. Henry found the North Vietnamese absolutely intractable. They wouldn't even negotiate. And the reason was clear. No threat, and no offer, could obscure one great fact known to the world at large. The American people had turned against the war. The young were saying they wouldn't fight it. The response to Eugene McCarthy's Democratic primary campaign in 1968 convinced the North Vietnamese that it was only a matter of time before the US would *have* to pull out, no matter what. So why negotiate?"

the last 10 years. There could well be consequences in the Soviets imitating our own expansionist behavior of the cold war era. And that could be bad for many people in the world, as the Afghans are finding out right now, and dangerous to the world. And dangerous to human survival, as Carter's responses to the Afghanistan crisis are demonstrating.

Their second fear, that is even more likely to occur but much less ominous, is that the U.S. will no longer be as free to make such threats and interventions in the future as it was in the past. That would not mean that we would be precluded from making threats by lack of our superiority because parity has been and is a basis for such interventions and threats; but it's not as good a basis as the overwhelming superiority we had before and one would expect presidents to be more cautious and circumspect in their approach than before.

But to judge the Soviets by the U.S.—which is in a way what the hawks do when they ask themselves, "What would we do in such and such circumstances?"—could be over pessimistic. Not because they're nicer than we are, or less expansionist, but

because our ruling circles have habits of thought that reflect over 20 years of continuous superiority. In particular, 16 years of near-monopoly of strategic nuclear weapons; something the Russians have never known and never will. What is at issue for U.S. leaders is giving up something they have enjoyed for a long time and which has been a tangible benefit. That is part of the explanation why they are so reluctant to change their ways of thought and to accept the possibility that these practices have become excessively dangerous. They always were but they have become more so.

One could find hope in that the Soviets have not been so long on this course of precise imitation. But then you could argue the contrary way, that they have never enjoyed these benefits and now they are on the verge of being able to imitate us. Which would be to say that it may just be too late for us. It's possible.

Brezhnev's departure could, I suppose lead either way.

Interviewer: In a sense, the problem now is complicated because instead of one bully, there are two.

Ellsberg: There are two and more coming. I

think that every country that acquires these will be confronting traditional adversaries, or victims, rivals or whatever, on their borders and elsewhere in comparison to whom they will now have a monopoly on nuclear weapons. And I think it's to be expected that they will follow our example, which they tend to know a lot better than the American public does; some of them have been on the receiving end of it, or have been channels of communication for these threats.

So they are much more aware than our public that the weapons are "usable." We have in fact used them: just as a gun is used when it's pointed at somebody, even if it doesn't go off. And, they know that. And I think they'll feel by our example that it's legitimate, certainly not without precedent, to make these threats themselves when they're useful.

Interviewer: So this leads to the nth power problem, where someone is going to drop a bomb on somebody and no one is going to know who did it. It's going to threaten everybody.

Ellsberg: That is a possibility. Or you may know, but that doesn't make it a lot better when you consider what you have to do about that. The world has been getting progressively more dangerous, and it's been more dangerous in the past than we realized.

Let me give a sense of what the danger is in physical terms. I mentioned earlier that we launched an airborne alert in '61, in response to the supposed Russian predominance at that time. Many people in the Air Force and the Pentagon were very proud of the missile gap hoax. They said there was no other way they could get enough tax money for the necessary weapons to maintain our superiority—which was the real issue. They said, now we have the Minutemen missiles and the B-52's. At worst we wasted money. Why worry about it?

The first thing that we did at the time was the airborne alert. As a result of the airborne alert more bombs than before began dropping out of the sky on the United States. These planes were not built for continuous flying. They were very high-performance aircraft for thermonuclear weapons built to be used for one round-trip. They're not built to be used for days and days at a time as they were for the airborne alert. So fatigue problems began to set in, including pilot fatigue, along with metal fatigue, and wings would fall off, engines would fall off, collisions occurred, and the bombs would fall. Now one I recall in particular, when I

was at Rand was on January 24th, 1961. A B-52 crashed near its home base, Seymour Johnson Air Force Base right near Goldsboro, North Carolina. In the course of crashing it dropped from the air one of its H-bombs, a 24 megaton weapon. It had six independent safety devices to keep it from exploding by accident. These devices are supposed to make it as improbable that it should go off as being hit by a meteor in the city, if you've heard that analogy before. Five out of the six failed in the course of the fall and the crash. So one safety device protected it from a possible full thermonuclear explosion. If it had gone off it would have released more explosive power than all the wars of human history—in this one bomb.

And I want to enlarge on that a little because, people interested in the environment can't really grasp the threat to survival that's posed by these weapons unless they have a very clear picture of the difference between an atom bomb and an H-bomb. I've discovered that most young people have never known that.

The H-Bomb that dropped accidentally near Goldsboro, and that was one safety device from going off, had the explosive power of 24 million tons of TNT.

The atom bomb at Nagasaki was a plutonium-implosion bomb—which works by fission of the atom. The thermonuclear H-bomb works by the fusion of hydrogen atoms, and is triggered by a uranium or plutonium fission bomb providing the heat and pressure to set off the thermonuclear reaction which can be a thousand times more powerful than the Nagasaki A-bomb. Today, most hydrogen warheads are only on the order of three to fifty times Nagasaki. But this is misleading because they can be of unlimited power. The thermonuclear reaction is normally used in these weapons to trigger a third stage which is again fission. If you fill a ship with U238 (a cheap uranium isotope) and put an H-bomb in the middle of it and blow the whole ship up, there would be no limit to the explosion you could get with a thermonuclear reaction.

So the H-bomb has launched an era of destruction that is literally unlimited. The H-bomb that was dropped near Goldsboro was over a thousand times more powerful—aside from the radioactive effects of the fall-out—than the Nagasaki atom bomb which had the explosive force of 20,000 tons of TNT. In World War II we

dropped two million tons of high explosives—including the two atom bombs. In Vietnam we dropped almost four times that; we were dropping a million tons a year by '67, seven and a half million tons in all from 1965 to 1975. That's a Nagasaki bomb a week for seven-and-a-half years. We killed most of the two million or so Vietnamese who died in those ten years. So we killed a lot of people. Two million is what Auschwitz killed.

But the H-bomb that dropped accidentally near Goldsboro and that was one safety device from going off had the explosive power of 24 million tons of TNT. That is, three Vietnams in one bomb. Or twelve World War II's in one bomb. In the 1960's a B52 normally carried two or four of those and B52's have dropped all four at various times—in Palomares, Spain, or again, in Thule, Greenland, all four bombs were dropped—at other times, one or two. In the '60's, in other words, we dropped more bombs on the United States and territories from American planes by accident, than the Russians had on ICBM's in 1961. We were then the only threat to our national security.

Now in those days—we had 600 B52's carrying two to four H-bombs, and fourteen-hundred B47's that could carry a couple plus about a thousand tactical bombers which could carry one comparable bomb like that, capable of hitting Russia. In the face of four Russian ICBM's, we then added the thousand Minutemen, the 41 Polaris and Poseidon submarines and more.

Since I have given all these figures let me give one other to pin down the point I was making earlier: that almost none of these has been needed at any given time for deterrence of nuclear attack. At present, a single Poseidon submarine can carry up to two-hundred and twenty-four nuclear warheads—each warhead several times larger than the Hiroshima weapon. There are two-hundred and eighteen Russian cities with populations over one hundred thousand. So one submarine under the command of the captain can threaten every large city in Russia. We have thirty-one Poseidon submarines; and ten Polaris submarines which can hit one hundred and sixty targets. We keep twenty to thirty of those at sea all the time. If the Russians send their entire force against us, they can't destroy a single one of those submarines. And every submarine can threaten every one of their cities. This is the situation to which the President proposes to add the MX missile and the Trident submarine.

Interviewer: Which already exists and is

already in the ocean.

Ellsberg: Yes and if deterrence is your goal the MX has no purpose at all. So then one asks, well, why is he doing this?

Interviewer: Yes, what is the goal?

Ellsberg: I think for the same purposes as in the past; to bully smaller nations. You wouldn't need all this destructive power to bully a small nation if Russia did not exist. But most of the small nations that we've been opposed to are allied to Russia. So, if we want to be able to say to Russia: we may have to batter or even annihilate your small friend here, like North Vietnam, and you had better not get into the fray—you'd better stand back—then we can't have too many weapons in the balance. We want to be able to say to Russia, "Look, you don't want to mix it up with us because although you could hurt us disastrously, we are enormously bigger than you are." That's a better position from which to make these threats than the position we now have, which is parity. I find that the President's determination to acquire that capability shows that he wants to be able to make those threats. There is no other rational or strategic reason to want those weapons.

In the 60's we dropped more bombs on the United States and territories from American planes by accident than the Russians had on ICBM's in 1961.

Interviewer: Does the context of being President force a normal person into that stance?

Ellsberg: Well, I've emphasized how normal these people are. But they aren't in every respect representative of the entire population. These are people whose determination to sit at the pinnacle of world power is not the same as your desire to do that, or my desire to do that. We are told about Carter's humility and his Christian commitment, and he is quite a prepossessing person, I find, on the whole. But we must also be aware of the reality that this is a man whose desire for vast, almost God-like power is extreme, very extreme. He's not like someone that you or I'd meet from day to day. One of the qualifications for his getting that job is an ability to keep it from showing, because, frankly, we wouldn't have elected any of these people if we'd understood realistically how willing they were to throw America's weight around in the form of nuclear threats.

Interviewer: I think it is apparent from our discussion that the public has a massive denial going about nuclear realities. People are not hearing it.

Ellsberg: Well, it's true. Yet in the first instance, it's ignorance, certainly. If you try to understand why there is that ignorance one must not underestimate the role of conscious deception and conscious concealment. These things have been kept very, very secret. When I talk to audiences, after Vietnam, Watergate, and the CIA revelations, I don't encounter much intellectual resistance on these points—even though it's completely new to them. On the contrary, people in the public find it both possible to believe this pretty fast—out of the blue—and very disturbing. And they react in a way that's very encouraging to me; a lot of them start getting very active. I'm convinced that it's mistaken to say that they're so apathetic, but that really they are ignorant first of the scale of the threat and more importantly of the possibility of doing anything about it. Let me just go a bit

Let me go just a bit further on a question you raised earlier—how did we get this way? I think very plausibly you have to say that this pattern of imperial behavior or of great power bullying, both of its own people and of neighbors, and other people in the world—goes back as far as cities. It is as old as civilization, as it is usually defined, in terms of cities, irrigation, agriculture, writing; and along with these, slavery, heavy sexism, racism, imperialism, empire, kings, priests, armies and major inequality—a package which the anthropologist Stanley Diamond calls "civilization." All of these things come pretty much at once with the




Superpowers' nuclear dependency

Admiral LaRocque

"As someone who has been directly involved in US nuclear planning, I can tell you my country has plans and forces for actually fighting nuclear war. Nuclear war is an integral part of American military planning and the US is prepared to use nuclear weapons anywhere in the world. I believe the Soviet Union is as nuclear-oriented in its military preparations as the United States. The military in both countries see nuclear weapons as a central instrument of military power. They are prepared to use them right now in many contingencies.

"The governments of the United States and the Soviet Union have carelessly let their relations deteriorate to an alarming extent. Political leaders must take control of events and not permit the military or technology to control them. The non-nuclear countries can act as the burr under the saddle to push the nuclear powers in the direction of reason. If we are to survive on this planet, the arms race must be slowed, stopped and reversed. The time to start is now."

— Rear Admiral Gene R. LaRocque
Director of the Center for
Defense Information
July, 1978, *The Defense Monitor*



big surpluses that you get from irrigated-field agriculture. All these other brutalizing phenomena, the impersonal destruction and the authoritarian regimes come with them. They don't characterize every part of the world at the same time. But ever since the appearance of cities, for five-thousand years or so, there have been these phenomena in the world.

I think the machismo factor is an important element. Out of this same pattern of behavior in which centralized power is held by men, grew male culture, the aggressiveness, the rivalry, the competitiveness, the willingness to contemplate massive, destructive or constructive works—for impersonal causes and abstract causes. "Winning," the most abstract cause of all, is part of our socialization in modern times, and that is primarily a male phenomenon. It would seem that this whole pattern has to be confronted and somehow changed.

In the short run we have to work to disarm the male power holders of the world of thermonuclear weapons and atomic weapons, as quickly as possible. I think we have to do that on a time scale far shorter than the one in which we could contemplate really changing the whole nature of world culture in these ways, or even the world power structures. Just as I thought it was essential to work to get the bombing of Vietnam ended, more quickly than one could imagine changing the power structure of the United States. I didn't know much about radical or revolutionary thought, coming out of the Rand Corporation and the Pentagon into the anti-war movement. But it seemed clear to me that whatever merits and whatever realism there could be in revolution, (and I've come to think there isn't much), that it certainly wasn't realistic to look at revolution in the U.S., in any sense of the term, as the answer to the Vietnam war. We just couldn't wait—the Vietnamese people would have ceased to exist long before major radical change could have taken place. It did prove possible to end the war. And the anti-war movement was crucial to that without any big change, and God knows there hasn't been any big change.

Interviewer: So that is a change, within the normal context?

Ellsberg: Yes, that's right. Even though people say nothing fundamental has changed, it was important to stop bombing Vietnam. And it is of far greater importance to disarm the world-states of nuclear weapons—even if everything else remains the same, with all the wars and the famines and everything else. It's simply a precondition for addressing any of those other problems. I can't really believe that life can persist very long with the level of

nuclear weapons and the dispersal of them that we have now achieved. That has to change, this is not a status quo that can be lived with or for long, lived in.

Our problem then is to reverse five thousand years of imperial culture, imperial, patriarchal culture based on warfare and some twenty-five years of thermonuclear weapons. That's the problem.

Ellsberg: During the second World War, on the basis of decision-making that was secret from every public, a number of countries began for the first time in the history of modern warfare; to accept as natural, legitimate, inevitable and practical, taking cities as targets. This included all their inhabitants, mostly non-combatants, the women, the children, the sick, the old. Thus destruction was indiscriminate in that civilians were the actual targets. The idea was to kill enough people to disorganize their industry, perhaps, but in any case to demoralize the population and bring about the collapse of their war-effort. And that, as I say, was a decision that was not taken democratically; it was never discussed publicly at all as a strategy. Officials in both England and America strongly denied to their publics that there was deliberate

We have had our nuclear Harrisburgs already, with nuclear weapons.

targeting of civilians. They described any civilian deaths as being accidental and inescapable as they went after military targets. When Truman announced the atom bomb, it was in a communique that said, "Today we have hit Hiroshima, a military headquarters in Japan."

Now the H-Bomb goes really beyond the city as a target to destroy regions of the environment. You're talking now about a weapon that would have destroyed most of the ecology of North Carolina with lethal effects for half a million years if it had gone off accidentally. Just as a Harrisburg would have destroyed most of Pennsylvania if it had reached a core meltdown. Thanks to these weapons policies based on public ignorance and official deception, we have had our nuclear Harrisburgs already, with nuclear weapons. But the public doesn't know of them because they were kept classified. Later it comes out bit by bit, but nobody has put it all together and realized what the nature of the problem is. Unless policy has changed recently, they have never been willing to release the total amount of nuclear waste made in the weapons program. So it hasn't drawn the attention of the environmental movement, even though

there is every presumption that it's enormously larger than the waste from nuclear energy.

Well, I'm saying that the same is true on the accidents. We had over thirty major accidents involving nuclear weapons in a possible nuclear explosion by '68. That is an average of one a year since Nagasaki, plus hundreds of what they regard as lesser accidents still involving a nuclear weapon that didn't come as close to exploding. And of course these things are transported, they're flown all the time. We came as close to a catastrophic accident in the Goldsboro case alone as Harrisburg came to a core meltdown—very close, beyond human control.

This will continue to happen in all parts of the world as these weapons are dispersed. The other countries are likely to have much worse safety devices—which are expensive and complicated—than we have. And some of ours fail nearly every time a bomb drops. They don't all fail fortunately. In a number of cases there have been high-explosive explosions. You see, the plutonium bomb which detonates the thermonuclear explosion itself is triggered by a high explosive charge, which compresses it. When the high explosive goes off which is not supposed to happen in the event of an accidental drop, it blows the plutonium all over the place, contaminating the area forever; you can't find every speck of it and every speck of it is carcinogenic, with a half-life of twenty-four thousand years. So, we've spread this stuff around parts of Thule, Greenland, Palomares, Spain and elsewhere.

(Editors note: We turned to a discussion of the history of democracy and the need for greater participation in our country's military policies.)

Ellsberg: Early in our country's history the rich found that they didn't have as much to fear from democracy as they had thought. If you handle the society right in terms of management, of media, of public relations and of growth and economics; and if you press issues of nationalism, which is the

only unifying element in people's thought; and, at the same time you keep alive everything that will divide them by sex, by race, and by region so they can't get together on other issues, you can stay on top.

So you can extend the vote and live with it. Did extending the vote to women make the difference that people had hoped or feared it would? No. Still, I believe increasingly that greater democracy is the direction that offers us our only promise. But it isn't enough to have the small degree of democracy that we have in this country—even though I would say without hesitation, we have more in terms of procedural safeguards, public information and popular influence than practically any other large country. It's not enough, yet, to keep us from destroying ourselves and the rest of the world.

I am very hopeful about democracy because without it the war in Vietnam would still be going on. As Nixon keeps pointing out bitterly, it was Americans who stopped the bombing. And it wasn't Nixon or Carter or Ford. Against the protest of all these men in power, other Americans outside government (and some in government and Congress who were most responsive to the people outside the government) managed to end it. Without the amount of free speech that we have, the influence that people have and the ability to protest in civil disobedience without being exiled or killed; without these abilities I think the bombs would still be falling. This is one of the strongest proofs one can point to in all of history of the power of these approaches to control even foreign policy. But it did not protect the Vietnamese for thirty years: it took ten years of intense activity to bring that about. And even then it took a lot of luck. It was in no way guaranteed that the system would work in that fashion. But it showed the possibilities of using the same kind of approaches we used against the war to protect our whole environment and life on earth from destruction.

Assistant Secretary of State on the US Nuclear First-Use

February 3, 1980 NBC Television Show Newsmakers

Question: If we were alone, if we got less support (from our allies) than we had hoped, what are the chances of having to use, resort to nuclear weapons?

William Dyess-Assistant Secretary of State: I would hope the chances are very small, almost nil because we and the Soviets have the ability to destroy one another and, of the entire U.S.-Soviet relationship their strategic aspect is still by far the most important and that is why we have to move forward when we can with SALT. We both want to survive. I would believe that the nuclear option is not something that is right at the front. However, if there should be hostilities there is no way that either side can feel comfortable that the conflict would not escalate. That's the problem, escalation...

Question: Don't both sides have a reason for not wanting to have this wind up as a thermonuclear holocaust? Isn't that the reason for the Russian's perhaps showing some moderation and based on your own experiences in dealing with them do you think that that is a real concern on their part?

William Dyess: Oh yes. I think that survival is just as genuine a concern on their part as it is on ours and I think that they are just as horrified by the prospects of a nuclear war as we are. That is perhaps our greatest single defense and is the thing that brought us to the negotiating table to try to get a handle on their nuclear arms race and increase

stability in that particular portion of the relationship. But that does not guarantee that our interest will not clash in a particular area of the world and where the stakes are high the confrontation could get out of hand. That is the danger...

Question: In nuclear war are we committed no to make the first strike?

William Dyess: No sir.

Question: We could conceivably make an offensive...

William Dyess: We make no comment on that whatsoever, but the Soviets know that this terrible weapon has been dropped on human being twice in history and it was an American president who dropped it both times, therefore, they have to take this into consideration in their calculus...

Question: If I could clarify something you said earlier, if you don't mind, with respect to the use of nuclear power, you said we have not given up the first strike option and you pointed out that it has been a United States president who has used nuclear weapons the only two times that they have been used.

William Dyess: Yes.

Question: Those can be interpreted as rather threatening statements. Is it our policy to threaten the use of nuclear power in this situation?

William Dyess: No. It is not our policy to threaten. I am simply calling attention to a part of history because it was a logical part of the answer to the question that you asked. I didn't raise that.

Question: Part of the other answer to that question too, is the fact that at the time those presidents used nuclear weapons we were the only ones that had them.

William Dyess: Yes.

One could say the same about the processes of environmental poisoning and pollution, the exhaustion of resources and many other things. I am focusing on the nuclear weapons question because it could wipe us out very quickly.

A focus on thermonuclear weapons is regarded by some people as being a distraction from the general problem of war and of arms in general. Why focus on these particular weapons, when the other weapons kill too? But I think they're not in touch with the factor of scale here. I made the point earlier, that we dropped immense tonnage on Vietnam without using nuclear weapons, but one has to realize that a single, large thermonuclear weapon would have more explosive power, and in terms of fallout could have killed more people than died in Vietnam. These are weapons which kill two million if you drop them near two million people. They kill six million if you drop them near six million. It's partially a matter of how concentrated people are, but with the fallout they don't have to be concentrated. That's why measures like going to jail for entering grounds, or sitting on railroad tracks do not seem overwrought or inappropriate.

My son said, when we were on our way to jail together after being arrested in Rocky Flats on May 12th, 1978, that he had read of a camp in Germany where the occupied troops after the immediate end of the war had forced nearby townspeople to tour the camp, which they had lived near all this time but had never been inside. And they all said, "We didn't know what was coming out of the stacks and what was going along in those cars." My son said that people should have been sitting on those tracks at Auschwitz and Dachau even if some of them died for it. And he said, "People should be sitting on the tracks from now on outside Rocky Flats," the plant which produces all the components for thermonuclear weapons. We have thirty thousand warheads in America. Twenty-two thousand of them average the size of a Hiroshima or Nagasaki weapon. Nine thousand are strategic weapons from twenty to a thousand times larger. Rocky Flats is still producing three to ten a day. The MX and the Trident will increase our number of strategic weapons to twelve thousand, and, perhaps, to twenty thousand warheads. The Russians are doing the same. This process is not even included in the SALT negotiations. We are adding the MX and the Trident because we refused to include them in the negotiations.


Interviewer: What can people do? The issue is much more serious than we have admitted. Not only do we need non-proliferation, but we need disarmament. What suggestions or thoughts do you have?

Ellsberg: We should not add any of the weapons Carter is proposing to our thirty thousand warheads. They are not needed for deterrence of nuclear attack. The United States' role of nuclear vigilante can no longer be safely carried out in this world of superpower parity and nuclear proliferation. There is no choice but to reconstitute international institutions of consensus and law that can constrain the unilateral military initiatives of all parties, including both the Soviets and ourselves.

I would like to see a no-first-use policy adopted. I think it's not at all a mere symbolic or formal matter. I think it should have — must have if its aim is to be achieved — vast influence on our planning, our threatening behavior and our armament. We should commit ourselves to never be the first to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances whatever. Nuclear weapons would not be a substitute for other weapons. At most, they would have no other reason than to deter nuclear attack. Most Americans think that is the case already, but they are wrong.

The fact is that at any given time the overwhelming portion of nuclear weapons possessed by the United States has been for the purpose of posing a threat of nuclear escalation, either from conventional to tactical nuclear warfare or to still higher levels of strategic warfare "if necessary."

A United States' commitment never,



under any circumstances, to initiate nuclear warfare would compel the United States Administration, Congress and the public to evaluate, at last the United States' needs for nuclear weapons in the light of the sole function of deterring nuclear attack. In this light it would appear beyond controversy that the United States already possesses vastly more nuclear weapons that can be justified by this function of nuclear deterrence, and the case for still further additions would nearly vanish. A no-first-use commitment by the United States would almost destroy any conceivable Pentagon argument for the MX Missile, the Cruise Missile, the neutron warheads, or the Trident submarine and its new missiles as additions to U.S. forces.

The Soviets have, in fact, repeatedly proposed such a commitment bilaterally. They wouldn't make the commitment unless we did too — they may have wanted a first use threat against China — and we always refused. A no-first-use commitment is the right course for us to take even if the Russians had shown no previous interest in it; but obviously, we should demand that they now accompany or follow our commitment, as they have proposed in the recent past. Along with that, they too should demonstrate a willingness to back it up by joining us in the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from front-line positions and from ships at sea.

Moreover, the President should propose an immediate bilateral moratorium on all further testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons — including all those just mentioned, and the Soviet counterparts — while the two superpowers negotiated a bilateral permanent freeze. These two steps are the essential precursors to bilateral and multilateral negotiations for major reductions, and ultimately the reliable global abolition of all nuclear weapons.

So long as the United States and its NATO allies, on the other hand, choose to rely on defending Western Europe against non-nuclear attacks by maintaining the credibility of initiating both tactical and nuclear war against nuclear-armed Soviet forces for the defense of Western Europe, no nuclear disarmament whatever seems practically attainable, since even suggestions that we might forego new offensive

weapons systems — let alone reduce current ones — can plausibly be claimed to weaken this credibility. The very possibility of actual reductions in Western nuclear stockpiles depends upon the willingness of the United States and its allies to abandon their current threat to initiate the destruction of the northern hemisphere in the event of a Soviet non-nuclear attack.

I have to say, realistically, that I think the odds are very much against the program that I've described being adopted even in the next year or two. The momentum toward the present build-up of our arsenals, and the inevitable Soviet imitation, is very strong. The reception of the recent Russian proposal that they would dismantle some of their missiles if NATO would forego adding six hundred new missiles to their inventory was very disheartening to me. Carter simply brushed it aside and said we will go ahead with our building first and then we will talk about cutting back. I believe what Brezhnev says; if we go ahead they are going to go ahead too. Our talks about cutting back will start some years from now in an environment where both sides have increased their number of warheads by 50-100%.

Interviewer: Do you think that there is going to be a major accident?

Ellsberg: Yes. First let me say right away, there have been major accidents. These happen not to have been regarded as major accidents. But you mean one in which an actual nuclear explosion occurs. Yes, of course, whether it's our or somebody else's. More and more countries are going to be flying with these things, transporting them. We've dispersed them all over the world. They are subject to capture, to sabotage, and to terrorist attacks, as well as accidents and deliberate use. So we're multiplying all these risks. As an immediate program we should stop all that.

People will say, "You mean unilateral disarmament?" But to forego a weapon that doesn't exist yet, like the MX missile, is not properly described as unilateral disarmament, or disarmament at all. Yet, that is the way it's heard all the time.

We're not talking about unilateral disarmament; the objective has to be a global disarmament. Nothing other than will protect the human species. But it's

got to start somewhere and as long as we're going up, we are not starting the process of going down. We cannot possibly induce other countries, starting with the Russians, to stop — let alone go down — if we keep going up. An it won't interfere in any way with our national security . . .

So it's a race, in which it's not at all guaranteed that the human species will be the winner. On the contrary, I think the odds favor that we will wipe ourselves out with the weapons that have already been produced, and with the behavior patterns that we have clung to so long. But I don't think that is the way one should bet with one's life. We don't have to use our lives for furthering that process. We can oppose that with some chance of success, as the Vietnam war shows. The movement will have to include all electoral activities, with an awareness that presidential elections never shortened the war by a day — time after time candidates were elected who seemed likely to end that war. And they always betrayed those votes. Congressional elections turned out to count for more. Even letter writing to Congress turned out to be very influential, although during the war I had assumed that that was make-work. That's why Nixon hired enormous numbers of fake letter writers in the course of the war to support his policies. And they look back on it as one of their most useful activities.

Interviewer: How about civil suits?

Ellsberg: Civil suits, yes, never explored sufficiently. Also, non-violent civil disobedience, not as a substitute for anything else and not as accomplishing anything by itself, but as an ingredient that stimulates people to address some of these problems in conscientious terms. And to alert them to the urgency of a threat that makes it appropriate for large numbers of people to take risks of a kind that they don't ordinarily take from day to day. Risks to their career and to their standing in the community — of opposing national policies, which is always risky, even in this country. But since it's less risky in this country than any other large country in the world, and probably more effective, I think that gives us a responsibility that Russian citizens don't have to the same degree. Their dissenters are the ones who disappear or are forced to emigrate. We don't have that excuse for passivity . . .

They are subject to capture, to sabotage, and to terrorist attacks, as well as accidents and deliberate use.

Interviewer: Assuming you have got the centralized structure which we have now, can you use the type of thinking you used at Rand to dismantle it? Not the type of thinking in terms of millions of people, but how do millions people start being broken down into thousands?

Ellsberg: Well, yes and no. It can be used. I do agree that such orderly thought processes of framing and comparing alternatives have to be used at some point in almost any context. But at the same time, I have growing reservations about the limits and risks of "systems analysis."

This kind of thinking is usually at the service of centralized power. And there is a reason for that, aside from the fact that such sponsors pay much better. Put abstractly, its nature is to make a very strong differentiation between ends and means, between instruments and purposes, which I now see as quite an artificial and arbitrary distinction. It is a way of thinking which educates people into regarding certain other things or beings or forces — including humans — as being nothing but instruments or as only means. It orients you toward an almost exclusive preoccupation with working one's will upon things, societies, environments and people.

One might say, "Well what is wrong with that? You know, babies do that, all humans do that, that is what living is." And we are encouraged to think that it is. But there is a lot to living in the world that is not appro-

priately described as changing it to suit our will. The notion that that is all that there is distracts you from the question of determining what your obligations are, quite apart from your own will, to a community of life on earth. What are your values; what should they be? What rights should you struggle to defend, should you sacrifice for?

Systems analyses at Rand encourages people to think of humans in the way that imperial rulers think of the rest of the population. By that way of thinking the people are there for the ruler's benefit. They are there to be pushed around and to be ruled and to be bullied. I am not talking about the preoccupation with how we accomplish given purposes, given by some higher authority — systems analysis is good for that, that's what it's made for — but about a different activity which is deciding what it is we want, who we are, and what we care about.

One should not rely upon higher authorities to answer what one wants to take care of. The process — if you don't take it from a priest, or more likely nowadays, from a secular state official — is not like systems analysis at Rand; it really is something different. It is deciding whether and why you should care about trees. Are trees and rivers part of the family or not? We don't really ask ourselves why we feel some obligation to keep a sister or brother from starving, from poverty, or dying for lack of care. We sort of understand, or feel, or we grow up with the notion that we have an obligation to do that, but we are not just assigned to it by some secular authority. To a lesser extent we have that feeling about other people in our own nation.

But there are no limits to the brutality which people like ourselves are capable of

inflicting, on orders from "higher authority," upon the nationals of another country. To think that we were more humane as combatants in our policies toward countries such as Germany and Japan — specifically, our bombing policies against urban populations — than those countries were toward their national enemies is flatly wrong.

The fact is that in attacking city-dwellers neither side had any scruples, any scruples whatever. Britain and, somewhat later, the U.S. made people who lived and worked in cities a special target, relatively and absolutely speaking, much more than did any of the other combatants on either side. We were limited solely by technology.

I think that has to change. And that won't change as fast as, say, an MX Missile program could be stopped. Both have to change; and the underlying values — that now make possible weapons for first strike and local first-use like the MX or the neutron bomb — above all have to change, towards a stronger identification with all human life, and all life.

Ellsberg: But, the truth is, as urgent as the current issues are, it may take changes of that more fundamental level before we achieve many of the "short range" technical goals. It may be that you can't achieve them in sequence like that, I'm not so sure.

Interviewer: We are getting practical. We are gathering information here that will go out to thousands of readers. We don't know what people will do with this information. But we suspect they are going to do the same thing you did when you sat at the Pentagon and saw this and said, "Oh, my god." We have still got millions of people we have got to get this information to.

Ellsberg: I certainly agree with what you're

The Danger of Nuclear Weapons: Even Without War

The dispersion of 30,000 US nuclear weapons across the world's oceans, in dozens of parts, in numerous countries in Europe and Asia, and in the United States creates risks of accidents of unprecedented magnitude.

The Department of Defense has admitted at least eleven of what it calls "Broken Arrows," or major nuclear accidents. The Atomic Energy Commission reports at least four other accidents involving various components of nuclear weapons while under the agency's control. There is evidence that many other unreported and unconfirmed nuclear accidents have occurred since World War II. Serious students of the problem estimate that an average of one US nuclear accident has occurred every year since 1946, with some estimating as many as thirty major nuclear accidents and 250 "minor" nuclear incidents during that time.

Five Serious Examples of "Broken Arrows"

1. Aircrash over Palomares, Spain. On January 17, 1966 an American B-52 bomber collided with a KC-135 refueling tanker causing the deaths of five crewmen and the dropping of four hydrogen bombs which were recovered after an intensive ground and sea search. Radioactive leakage and conventional explosions occurred in the area.

2. Bomb accidentally dropped over South Carolina. On March 11, 1958, a B-47 bomber accidentally dropped a nuclear weapon in the megaton range over Mars Bluff, South Carolina. The conventional explosive "trigger" of the nuclear bomb detonated leaving a crater 75 feet wide and 35 feet deep. One farmhouse was obliterated. Luckily no nuclear radiation leakage was detected, no nuclear explosion occurred and no one was killed.

3. Bomarc Missiles Burned in Fire. On June 7, 1960, a fire at McGuire Air Force Base led to a series of shattering explosions and the destruction of one of 56 nuclear armed Bomarc missiles. While no nuclear explosion occurred there was a small amount of radioactive leakage creating a temporary health hazard.

4. 24-Megaton Bomb Safety Devices Sprung. On January 23, 1961, a near catastrophe occurred at Goldsboro, North Carolina when a B-52 bomber had to jettison a 24-megaton bomb. Five of the six interlocking safety devices were set off by the fall. A single switch prevented the bomb from exploding, an explosion which would have been over 1800 times more powerful than the Hiroshima bomb.

5. Greenland Air Crash Scatters Plutonium. On January 21, 1968 a B-52 attempting an emergency landing at Thule Air Force Base, Greenland, crashed and burned on the ice of North Star Bay. The high explosive components of all four nuclear weapons aboard detonated producing a plutonium-contaminated area of at least 300-400 feet wide and 2200 feet long.

— from *The Defense Monitor*, Vol. 4, No. 2, February 1975

A complete listing of 31 known US nuclear weapons accidents may be found in *World Armaments and Disarmament SIPRI Yearbook 1977*, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.

The Power of The Movement

Richard M. Nixon Memoirs

"I decided to 'go for broke' in the sense that I would attempt to end the war one way or the other — either by negotiated agreement or by an increased use of force.

"One reason for making this decision at this time was my feeling that unless I could build some momentum behind our peace efforts over the next several weeks, they might be doomed to failure by the calendar. Once the summer was over and Congress and the colleges returned from vacation in September, a massive new antiwar tide would sweep the country during the fall and winter...By early spring the pressures of the November 1970 elections would make congressional demands for more troop withdrawals impossible to stop and difficult to ignore...

"I decided to set November 1, 1969 — the first anniversary of Johnson's bombing halt — as the deadline for what would in effect be an ultimatum to North Vietnam.

"On July 15 I wrote a personal letter to Ho Chi Minh. Jean Sainteny acted as our courier. I met with him at the White so that he would be able to talk at firsthand about my strong desire for peace. But I also told him to say that, unless some serious breakthrough had been achieved by the November 1 deadline, I would regretfully find myself obliged to have recourse 'to measures of great consequence and force...'

"In the weeks remaining before November 1, I wanted to orchestrate the maximum possible pressure on Hanoi. I was confident that we could bring sufficient pressure to bear on the diplomatic front. But the only chance for an ultimatum to succeed was to convince the Communists that I could depend on solid support at home if they decided to call my bluff. However, the chances I would actually have that support were becoming increasingly slim.

"There was talk of hold a 'Moratorium,' a nationwide day of protest, on October 15, right in the period most crucial to the success of my November 1 ultimatum.

"In a press conference on September 26,

in answer to a question about the Moratorium and other public protests against the war, I said, 'Now, I understand that there has been and continues to be opposition to the war in Vietnam on the campuses, and also in the nation. As far as this kind of activity is concerned, we expect it. However, under no circumstances will I be affected whatever by it.'

"I was fully aware of the furor that this statement would cause. But having initiated a policy of pressure on North Vietnam that now involved not only our government but foreign governments as well, I felt that I had no choice but to carry it through. Faced with the prospect of demonstrations at home that I could not prevent, my only alternative was to try to make it clear to the enemy that the protests would have no effect on my decisions. Otherwise my ultimatum would appear empty...

"On October 14th I new for sure that my ultimatum had failed...

"I had to decide what to do about the ultimatum. I knew that unless I had some indisputably good reason for not carrying out my threat of using increased force when the ultimatum expired on November 1, the Communists would become contemptuous of us and even more difficult to deal with. I knew, however, that after all the protests and the Moratorium, American public opinion would be seriously divided by any military escalation of the war.

"A quarter of a million people came to Washington for the October 15 Moratorium. Despite widespread rumors that some of the more radical left-wing organizations would provoke violent confrontations with police, the demonstrations were generally peaceful.

"On the night of October 15 I thought about the irony of this protest for peace. It had, I believed, destroyed whatever small possibility may still have existed of ending the war in 1969. But there was nothing I could do about that now. I would have to adjust my plans accordingly and carry on as best I could."

saying. Spreading the information even in the most traditional ways of newspapers and journals, debate, is crucially important. If I believed that the mass of the population already had values like those of the men in power, for the last generation, I would think there was very little chance, because the information wouldn't help. I think that's not true.

We have the evidence that the men in power, on the basis of their polls and experiments, concluded that it wasn't true and that's why they lied and they kept these things secret. Going back one point, 20 years ago, it has just recently come out, Eisenhower directed Williard Libby of the AEC to fuzz up the issues. He said, "Try to keep them confused" between A and H weapons, in order that the public would not interfere with the testing at the Nevada test site which did produce significant fallout and endanger people.

I hoped that getting information out during the Vietnam war would meet a different response in the public than that same information had produced inside the government, and that turned out to be true. I think there is every reason to believe that the public, with this kind of information, will react, will weigh it differently from our officials and to some extent at least, will act on it.

There is another question which goes a little beyond information in the ordinary sense and that is the question, how does one communicate to other people the fact that they must change their lives or take risks or

act? And that isn't just communication in the usual sense. It's misleading to think of that as just information. Empirically, it seems to take a personal example to make a very strong point: the example of someone who is changing their life or risking and acting in some committed way.

That is why I come back to the notion that to get people to do the work of publication; to get people to read it; to get the activities that you describe as disseminating this done; it's very useful to have this other ingredient that might seem quite unrelated; the example of committed actions of various kinds, whether they are risky disclosures by people, people risking their jobs, or civil disobedience and people going to jail. Because that motivates other people; it awakens their conscience and it doesn't simply convey information, it confronts them with the fact that perhaps their values need reexamination. Or their way of behaving doesn't have to be as passive, as complacent, as obedient as they have actually been to authority. That they must take the risks and the psychological strain of confronting authority.

Interviewer: I think it is important to stress here for people that that's what you did.

Ellsberg: Well, the Rocky Flats. Earlier, of course, I was indicted for the Pentagon Papers on charges that totalled 115 years. So, there's your risk. Rocky Flats seems like quite a holiday. I was up for only 3½ years, and that turned out to be useful to do, even as an example. But I was very conscious that I would never have thought of releasing the

papers if I hadn't had the example of people who were going beyond demonstrating or letterwriting.

I learned, like a lot of other people from the writing of Martin Luther King, Jr., and from Gandhi, and King himself learned from Gandhi, that to fail to resist evil is to be a party to it; is to be an accomplice to it. That's a very challenging unfamiliar thought because normally I guess the tacit response is that evil is something to be named and deplored. But in almost every case it's someone else's problem. Somebody else is responsible for doing something about it. But the notion that to be aware of it is to feel an obligation to act against it, to oppose it, is a very provocative attitude that gets you in a lot of trouble.

(Editor's note: The following story was written by Dr. Daniel Ellsberg in his preface to the book, *A Year of Disobedience* — a photo documentary on the demonstrations, civil disobedience, arrests and trials of thousands of people against the Rocky Flats Nuclear Weapons Plant (available from Joe Daniel Productions, 1610 Pine St., Boulder, Colorado 80302.)

The two arrests described were for sitting on railroad tracks out of the Nuclear Weapons Production Facility at Rocky Flats, Colorado, where the Rockwell Corporation manufactures all of the plutonium fission "triggers" in effect, the fission components of a Nagasaki-type bomb, now used to detonate an "H" bomb — for all U.S. thermonuclear weapons. The tracks, according to Rockwell, are needed for the removal of radioactive waste, so obstructing them, by sitting, vitally impeded their operations. The story illustrates, in a personal way, the impact of the movement.)

"The night of our first arrest, Marian Doub, our youngest member, was in tears. She had just been on the phone with her parents. Her mother felt very strongly that Marian should spend the rest of the spring studying for her exams at Boulder High; she'd been arrested enough for one term. I told Marian that I had a daughter just a little older and I knew how her mother felt. Any way, it was important she protect her relationship with her parents and their trust in her; there would be lots of opportunities in her life to risk arrest.

"Three days later, as we waited in a snowfield, within an enclosure of snowblocks we had built against the wind, the Rockwell Corporation finally gave us a train to stop. Someone shouted, "It's coming!" We began running and skidding down the hillside and across the snow-filled ditch that separated our camp from the track.

(They were arrested a second time.)

"The booking process in the jail took a long time. Late in the evening as I was being photographed, I found myself in a room with two women being newly booked in. One of them was Marian Doub.


"Marian had not come with us for the second occupation; I was surprised to see her. After spending the day in her classes at Boulder High, she explained, she had seen our arrest on the evening news and learned that the tracks were now unoccupied. So the two of them — she nodded toward the other woman now being booked — had driven to the tracks and found them deserted. In the darkness, carrying flashlights, they began walking down the tracks toward the plant. They held hands as they walked and sang.

"After a while they saw a light ahead on the tracks, growing larger. It was the train, coming out from the Rocky Flats plant that same night with its cargo of radioactive waste. The train came up close to them and stopped. Still singing, they both sat down in the snow between the rails. The two women chose to go limp when a policeman on board tried to remove them. He requested help and they were arrested.

"It had been a long day. My head was spinning as I listened to Marian's story. "The two of you stopped the train again? ... alone?" I glanced toward the other woman, who I had not met before, and asked Marian, "Who's your friend?"

"My mother."

Later, Marian's mother, Nancy Doub, gave the following testimony in court:



"We went out on the tracks and walked up the tracks in the dark, with our flashlights, singing, "We Shall Overcome," and "We Shall Not Be Moved." It was a very moving experience, standing next to my daughter. It's not the usual thing you imagine, for mother/daughter activity. It meant a lot to be standing beside my daughter. You know, it shouldn't just be the young people who are worried about this. It's not fair to give them that burden. So I was glad to be there."

Interviewer: How does that balance with posing positive examples?

Ellsberg: Showing that there are alternatives to war, as a way of resolving conflicts, would be very helpful. The people ended the Second World War with great hopefulness in institutions of world law. But in the euphoria of the nuclear program, the United States Government decided that we could act better as a government unilaterally. The cowboy approach-vigilante justice-was a little more appropriate to us because we were a one-man army. Depressing metaphor. But we didn't need the help of the other institutions; they would only tie us down. So we really moved away from all those notions of arbitration in world courts, or the UN as a world parliament.

Interviewer: And community?

Ellsberg: Community, that's right. So we get back to this point of how does one recognize and grow a sense of community. The big gestures in the past have often been subject to the limitations of considerable naivete as to just how sinister and ominous the activities of all these states were. As if people could just join hands across the ocean. It was kind of turning away from the reality of state behavior and state power.

If I were to quote the name of a pamphlet put out by a wide range of nuclear physicists in the late '40's about the atom bomb, I would be raising a slogan that seems totally discredited. The title was: "One totally discredited. The title was: "One World, or None." Have we not grown up for the last generation hearing "one worlder" as a term of contempt? But the world of unrestrained warring national states is not a world that can continue to exist, now that these states are potentially armed with nuclear weapons. It was compatible with human existence for several thousand years. It really isn't now.

And so this idea of learning a sense of community with other humans is crucial. But that alone will still not mobilize people in a way that's necessary unless they come to feel a sense of community with other non-human life and with the resources and the environment that supports life.

Interviewer: In the environmental movement when something is about to disappear forever, we try to save it. This is important, but we need to be thinking 20 years ahead, 100 years ahead.

Ellsberg: Yes, can the world remain with population increasing and with concentrations of people in high density cities, relying on fossil fuels and high

energy? Can this go on and yet avoid the nation state organization and the reliance upon it, and avoid the wars over natural resources as in the Middle East? Or does it follow that this more fundamental pattern of population causes our problems? I think it probably does. I don't think there are people who have the answer to these problems and can write it down in a book as to how to organize the population that we have in the world today into a more decentralized and more peaceful society, less reliant on high energy use. The models that we have of such a society are not only the neolithic but also the farm communities that are similar to the neolithic ones in different parts of the world until recently.

I think we need a lot of creative effort along those directions. Those are the questions we should be working on to answer rather than the ones we are dealing with, such as how to base MX missiles. I think that our hope lies in a sense of community, both in a conscious sense and a latent a readily available sense. The sense of a broad community with other life, with other humans and with the environment as a whole is much more present in the mass of the public than it is in that relatively small number of middle-aged men who manage all societies: men who have fought for and achieved positions of immense coercive power that distances their concerns from the concerns of most people, and who see most people somewhat abstractly and subject to manipulation and to destruction as well.

We haven't really talked much about one final point I think I should mention. There is a sex difference in attitudes on these things, both of the nature of community, the importance of community and values in general. The difference is between men and women in the large, though not between every individual. It seems that the forms of thought which are most valued, most highly paid and most useful to power structures are forms of thought that men have been trained to excel in. Whereas the intuitive caring for life that is born of women, and for other forms of life, by analogy, comes more easily to women. Women are not all mothers and don't all want to be mothers, but unlike the men who also came from mothers, they are encouraged to identify with mothers. A complicated thing, but though we all have mothers, the idea of mothering is something that men are trained to put behind them at an early age.

Now, I'm not saying women as the guardians of the spirit of concern for life must limit themselves to that. But I am saying that there is a good deal of empirical evidence that right now attitudes questioning the state's purposes and especially questioning the necessity for wars and winning are shown, by polls, to be more common to women. But that doesn't mean that they act democratically on those values. (In the case of Vietnam that happened also to be true of blacks compared to whites, perhaps because, like women, blacks were not so inclined to accept as true and

necessary the statements of white, middle-class males.)

Interviewer: I think you put your finger on a really important point. Men are raised to put nurturing behind them and that's the break at which the hierarchical power, game oriented kind of personality moves away from the caring-for kind of personality.

Ellsberg: A lot of feminists that I've met as individuals are very uneasy or even hostile if you point to something like this, because they regard this kind of woman's trait as a way of keeping them in a less valued kind of orientation or attitude, discouraging them from acquiring the skills, analytical thinking and aggressive competitiveness that they need to acquire power to account for more in the world. But even though it suggests a trait associated with an inferior power position it nevertheless has something to recommend it. It is regarded as a way of keeping people in oppression; I understand that in terms of the immediate context. But it has a long run context as well. I think it has to be recognized first, that this more favored, "male" way of thinking and acting, to which the President appeals when he warns us against being a pitiful, helpful giant, is an attitude that does make for getting ahead—not just in U.S. or capitalist society, but in most centralized, industrialized, urbanized societies. And, second, it's going to kill us all...

Was it well advised for Israel to acquire nuclear weapons, as they undoubtedly have? One could say, "Well, given their problems and the state of the world as it is, that was a very, wise, and prudent, and realistic thing for them to do. And it might be what is preventing war, right at this point." And yet, it is not being part of a movement against nuclear weapons, it means adding their weight to the momentum of the arms race instead of to the opposition, and I think as you look at the longer run it doesn't look very wise.

I think Gregory Bateson, at the Regent's meeting, put it very well. He said, "If one is thinking about the security of one's life and keeping what you have . . . , it may be that for people of my age this arms race is the best way to protect what we have in the next 10 years, the remainder of my life. But I don't think that's true for my granddaughter's generation."

Interviewer: Patriotism to Thomas Jefferson was the establishment of a society in which there was a continuing happy small community. He felt the best size for a democratic community was one you could walk across in an hour.

Ellsberg: I think what we're facing now is the truth in the assumption in Jefferson's time, that a country as large and centralized as ours now is can't remain a true republic. And it is also true that we should achieve democratic self-government.

So where do you go from here? I certainly want to see explored the possibility of great decentralization, great de-emphasis on national institutions as opposed to federated regional and local institutions. And a much greater sense that other nationals are not to be burned, boiled or shredded any more than we think it is appropriate for our own nationals to be cannibalized.

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The moral character and happiness of mankind are so interwoven with the operations of government, and the progress of the arts and sciences is so dependent on the nature of our political institutions that it is essential to the advancement of civilized society to give ample discussion to these topics.

Thomas Paine
1787

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The Mobilization for Survival (MFS) will be conducting a campaign this summer to educate people about the dangers of nuclear arms.

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